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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the use of policy and diplomacy by the British government in 
Southern Rhodesia during 1979-1980. In particular, the necessity of combining short-
term flexibility and contingency alongside long-term policy planning during this period 
will be explored. In order to do so, this thesis uses documents from the British National 
Archives, in particular files from the Prime Minister's Office (PREM) and the Cabinet 
Office (CAB). These documents, released in 2011, allow for a close examination of the 
issues faced by the British government in achieving long term goals whilst 
circumventing short term crises. This is due to their thorough documentation of high-
level political decisions within the British government and their chronological approach, 
which offers an insight into the ways in which priorities and alliances shifted over time. 
This work will contribute to the existing material and knowledge on the subject due to its
ability to use these recently released documents, which provide a more in-depth insight 
into high level British government political decisions on Rhodesia than had previously 
been available. By utilising these within a chronological approach, this work aims to 
show the development of long-term British government policy in Rhodesia and the 
ways in which emerging crises and changing relationships affected this.
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Introduction
British government diplomacy regarding Rhodesia during 1979 and 1980 was an 
invaluable tool. It allowed the government react to short and long term power shifts 
within the nation and wider Southern African region during a period where Western 
influence was increasingly limited. The use of diplomacy by the British government as a
way in which to affect policy in other nations, particularly the increasingly influential 
Frontline States, allowed for greater control over the implementation of long term policy 
goals in Rhodesia. The use of diplomacy to remain in close contact with these nations 
on a high political level had an impact on the ability of the British government to secure 
settlements on the future of Rhodesia and to control tensions within a region that was 
rapidly experiencing growing Cold War tensions. These tensions were particularly 
important as they drew other Great Powers such as the USA into the situation in 
Rhodesia, providing a counterweight in assemblies such as the UN against the often 
Socialist Frontline States. The British government was forced to balance cooperation 
with its allies alongside satisfying the demands of African nationalist governments in 
order to maintain as much stability as possible in Rhodesia. This was particularly vital 
during the vital Lancaster House Conference and 1980 elections, as these events were 
key to securing a legitimate transition to majority rule for the country. Most important to 
this stability in securing a settlement was diplomacy with the Frontline States, as the 
cultivation of influence with these nations in turn provided influence in organisations 
such as the OAU and offered a middleman through which the demands of the Patriotic 
Front could be addressed and countered. In return, the continuing economic and 
political dependence of these states on reaching a stable situation in Southern Africa 
was exploited in order to ensure that diplomacy was successful. The British government
and Frontline States both had an incentive for a mutually agreeable resolution in 
Rhodesia, with close and precise diplomacy at key intervals being important in 
preventing this from becoming an impossibility.
On the eve of the February 1980 general election in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, the British 
government held the greatest presence in the country since Ian Smith’s Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence fifteen years earlier in 1965. This presence was vital to 
the government’s wish to finish spreading the ‘Winds of Change’ across Africa that had 
been started almost twenty years earlier by Harold Macmillan. This had begun the 
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British government’s commitment to majority rule for its African colonies through the 
process of legitimate, organised and fair elections. Whilst this had for the most part 
proceeded quickly and relatively smoothly throughout the 1960s, progress in Rhodesia 
stalled as Ian Smith’s rogue white minority government stood between Britain and 
complete and successful decolonisation of her colonies within the continent. A 
legitimate election was the main aim of the British government with regards to 
Rhodesia during this period of involvement, as doing this would address a number of 
key concerns for Britain. Not only would a legitimate election overseen by the British 
government constitute success from a moral standpoint, but would also represent a 
coup for Britain in terms of political power and influence in the region. A majority-ruled 
Zimbabwe aligned with Britain would present a great opportunity for the British 
government to expand its influence within a Southern Africa dominated throughout the 
past five years by Socialist and anti-Western groups backed by China and the USSR. 
For this it will be necessary to closely look at the 1979 and 1980 elections in Southern 
Rhodesia1, as British influence and standing within both the region and the wider 
international community depended on the successful legitimisation of black majority 
rule in Rhodesia. This was a task that would only be made more difficult by the 
uncooperative nature of current Prime Minister Ian Smith, and his ideologically hostile 
opponents in the region. Smith’s major opponents were the African nationalist parties 
ZANU and ZAPU, which were Rhodesian parties that operated from outside the 
country. These were supported by the governments of the Frontline States, which 
included Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, and Mozambique. The Rhodesian Internal 
Settlement was a 1978 agreement between Ian Smith and moderate African leaders 
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Jeremiah Chirau. This agreement set 
terms for the country to hold elections leading to black majority rule in 1979, but 
excluded popular African nationalist parties ZANU and ZAPU. By this time, there was a 
need for the British government to be able to influence events in Rhodesia as 
successful and fair decolonisation still relied on the transition to legitimate majority rule. 
The new British Conservative government faced a situation in Rhodesia that was 
constantly changing as legitimate majority rule became vital. Due to the recent (2011) 
declassification of a number of PREM files at the National Archives, this work can utilise
1  Known from 1 June 1979-12 December 1979 as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, henceforth referred to 
as Rhodesia or Southern Rhodesia
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a rich collection of new primary materials in order to explore just how a need to 
establish a legitimate government in Rhodesia affected British government policy and 
diplomacy at the time. These sources will help to explore how this policy was 
formulated in response to wider British government fears about black liberation, the 
‘new’ Africa that was emerging from the ashes of European colonialism, Britain’s role as
mediator in international conflict, and the continued growth of the Cold War 
superpowers. 
The use of these recent sources will place this work within the framework of existing 
literature, but will aim to be able to show the progression of events in detail from the 
perspective of the highest levels of British government. Whilst existing works are 
valuable in understanding many of the issues surrounding British involvement in 
Rhodesia such as the changing political climate in Southern Africa and issues of 
electoral legitimacy in Rhodesia, many were written at the time and as such without 
access to new primary materials. Dunn's 'Diplomacy at the Highest Level' and Vines' 
'Liberation Movements in Power' cover issues surrounding British government 
diplomacy and involvement in Rhodesia from a modern perspective, but do not make 
the British perspective across a longer period the main focus of their work.23 The goal of
this thesis is to use close examination of British government archives in order to show 
the effects of shifting alliances, changing international situations and the emergence of 
crises on British government diplomacy and planning in Rhodesia. By offering a 
chronological look at high-level political decisions, it is the aim of this thesis to offer an 
insight into the longer-term impact of key short-term situations that the British 
government faced, such as at Lancaster House and during the 1979 and 1980 
elections themselves.
Methodology and existing material on the topic
Amongst the wider range of material that has been written about the later years of the 
Rhodesian UDI, there have been a number of main works covering the time period 
surrounding the 1979 and 1980 elections such as ‘The Zimbabwe Election: The political
and military implications’ by Martyn Gregory, and ‘From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The 
2  Dunn, D.H. ed., Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The evolution of international summitry. New 
York: Springer. 2016
3  SOUTHALL, ROGER. Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa. 
Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2013. 
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politics of transition’ by Wiseman and Taylor.45  These works largely concentrate on the 
implications of the elections and the process by which they were reached, and look at 
the situation more from a perspective that stays within the front lines of the Crisis within 
Africa, at times focusing on the British political aspect of the transition to majority rule, 
but without this becoming the main focus of these works. 
There have, however, been some works focusing intensely on the legitimacy of these 
elections, but even fewer still focusing on the political implications of this legitimacy to 
Britain, with the major works focusing on this aspect being ‘The April 1979 Elections in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’ by M Delap6,‘The 1980 elections- a first hand account and 
analysis’7 by Gregory and ‘From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe’ by Lord Soames,8 the then 
governor of Rhodesia. The general agreement on the definition of a legitimate election 
in Rhodesia was one brought about not by an Internal Settlement, but through the 
same process as had been used by the British government for past colonies. This 
would include an independence constitution providing the machinery for free and fair 
majority rule elections. As the Internal Settlement was between the rogue white minority
government of Smith and a small number of chosen political groups in the country, 
these criteria were not met. The exclusion of ZANU and ZAPU, and the lack of British 
government involvement in the process prevented the agreement from being 
internationally viewed as legitimate. As Rhodesia was still officially a British colony, 
Smith did not have the right to transfer power from British rule.
These three works give an invaluable insight into the 1979 and 1980 elections from a 
perspective that focuses on the events in Rhodesia during the election. These works 
offer viewpoints on impact that the conduct of the election had on its legitimacy and 
more importantly, how this legitimacy was to impact British long and short term policy in
Southern Africa. These works (particularly the work of Soames) give a valuable insight 
4  Wiseman, Henry, and Alastair M. Taylor. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: the politics of 
transition. Elsevier, 2013.
5  Gregory, Martyn. "The Zimbabwe election: the political and military implications." Journal of 
Southern African Studies 7, no. 1 (1980): 17-37.
6  Delap, Mick. "The April 1979 Elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia." African Affairs 78, no. 313 
(1979): 431-438.
7  Gregory, Martyn. "The 1980 Rhodesian Elections—A First-Hand Account and Analysis." The 
World Today 36, no. 5 (1980): 180-188.
8  Soames, Christopher. "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe." International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-) 56, no. 3 (1980): 405-419.
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into the issues of legitimacy during these elections and offer some immediate reaction 
into how these issues were addressed by the British government on the highest level; 
as such, this body of work is incredibly valuable at showing these issues from the 
perspective of those writing at the time, and in the case of Lord Soames offers a candid
look into government thought process during this time period regarding Rhodesia. But 
this is also the drawback of these works, and of literature regarding these Rhodesian 
elections as a whole; most works were written as reactions at the time, and have not 
had the advantage of thirty years of debate on the issue, or access to extensive 
government sources at will.  
This work aims, therefore, to expand on the factors driving British government policy 
during the 1979 and 1980 elections due to the ability to use resources which were 
unavailable at the time, and to take advantage of the relatively sparse nature of 
literature on the topic. The main way this will be achieved is by using Prime Minister’s 
Office (PREM) and Cabinet Office (CAB) files from the National Archives that were 
released as recently as 2011, and have as such seen little use in scholarly works. 
These files offer a close and thorough look into the formulation of British diplomatic and
foreign policy towards Rhodesia during the course of these years, and offers an insight 
previously unavailable. The Prime Minister's Office documents are generally between 
250 and 450 pages long, and primarily showcase diplomatic communication between 
the Prime Minister of Britain, members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 
important political actors within Southern Africa, the USA, or the Commonwealth. The 
Cabinet Office files show a summary of the week's events in Rhodesia and offer an 
insight into decisions and discussion at the highest level of British politics- that of the 
Prime Minister and her cabinet ministers.
These files are useful as they display government policy planning and diplomacy at the 
very highest level and provide an insight into the processes of both long-term planning 
and crisis management. These files will be used to build upon already established 
debates on the legitimacy of these elections, whilst closely showing the ways in which 
British government policy in Rhodesia shifted over time. The fact that these files are 
organised chronologically provides a strong case for a similarly structured exploration 
of them, as this will provide a natural way in which the evolution of British government 
policy-making and diplomatic communication as a response to events in Southern 
10
Africa can be examined. This can help to further highlight the shifting alliances and 
international pressures that acted as the driving forces of British government 
involvement in Rhodesia and in which ways these affected longer term policy plans for 
the nations decolonisation. A chronological approach can also show the impact of key 
events during this period on British policy formation and the points at which critical 
shifts in longer term diplomatic strategy occurred.
An important area of this was long-term policy planning following the widely criticised 
1979 election and the ways in which these plans gave way to short-term crisis 
management during 1979 and early 1980. For this thesis, policy is used to imply the 
longer-term plans formed by the British government, with these plans revolving around 
achieving specific overall goals, these being; the holding of a constitutional conference, 
the overseeing of an internationally legitimate election, and the eventual successful 
decolonisation of Rhodesia. Diplomacy here is used to refer to a fluid and often reactive
tool used in order to strengthen relationships and ease the implementation of longer-
term policy. Diplomacy was used during this period both as a constant force targeted at 
key allies and opponents in order to achieve long-term goals and also as a short-term 
method of navigating crisis scenarios.
Southern Africa in the 1970s; Decolonisation, Pan-Africanism, and the Cold War
In order to show the major themes of British government reactions to shifting alliances 
and situations thoroughly it is necessary to explain the issues driving the situation in 
Rhodesia by 1979, and why British involvement was required in order to end the crisis 
as peacefully as possible. By showing these forces pulling at Rhodesia during the late 
1970s it is possible to see why and how British involvement became key to establishing
a legitimate government in Rhodesia. This will help in placing this work within the 
academic framework on Rhodesia which already exists.
By the late 1970s, the nation of Rhodesia and its government were in a difficult 
situation. Since the UDI of 1965, the nation had withstood political, economic and 
military challenges from a number of enemies. ZANU and ZAPU, and their military 
wings ZANLA and ZIPRA, waged guerilla and conventional warfare within the country 
and gained external support and shelter from Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. As 
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the 1970s progressed, this support reached a global scale through Sino-Soviet backing 
of ZANU and ZAPU, whilst the UN condemned Smith’s government and passed 
Security Council Resolutions mandating sanctions. These factors led to the vast 
majority of countries refusing or unable to recognise or trade with Rhodesia, causing 
Rhodesia to be economic opponents who were becoming increasingly organised 
through pan-African cooperation. These issues were, by 1978, becoming 
insurmountable, leading to the situation in Rhodesia by then becoming an urgent need 
to draw the tenure of Ian Smith as a white minority leader to a close. 
A major issue which forced Rhodesia into the 1978 internal settlement and the eventual
acceptance of Britain as overseer for elections to end Ian Smith’s government along 
with the increasingly violent Bush War was that of decolonisation in Southern Africa 
during the 1970s. This began in the mid 1970s as Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola and 
Namibia all saw their governments become increasingly socialist, following support 
from the USSR and China during their decolonisation, leading to a feeling that ‘it was 
clear… that the focus for Cold War competition in Africa was shifting… to the Southern 
Part of the continent’,9 causing ever deepening rifts in relations between the Western, 
strongly anti-communist Rhodesia and her socialist neighbours. Due to the tumult 
created by these changes and power struggles within the former Portuguese empire, 
increasing pressure was put on Smith’s government in Salisbury which Hargreaves 
believes accelerated the collapse of Rhodesia as a white minority ruled nation due to 
the new-found ability of ZANLA and ZIPRA to infiltrate Rhodesia via Mozambique.10 The
issue of Rhodesia’s hostile neighbours was mentioned heavily throughout 1979 and 
1980 in British high level political discussion as a constant threat to security in the 
region. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s administration regularly entreated 
President Machel to provide more ways to limit the infiltration of ZANLA guerillas into 
Rhodesia during the elections from Mozambique,11 an issue that was continuing to his 
knowledge on a ‘large scale’12 up until the 1980 election despite the implemented 
ceasefire. 
9  Westad, Odd Arne. The global Cold War: Third world interventions and the making of our 
times. Cambridge University Press, 2005. 207.
10  Hargreaves, John D. Decolonization in Africa. Routledge, 2014. 235.
11  The National Archives (TNA): PREM 19/343 ‘Situation in Rhodesia 13’. 14-24 January 1980.
121.
12  TNA: PREM 19/343, ‘Situation in Rhodesia 13’. 14-24 January 1980. 230.
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This issue of decolonised states turning towards socialist government backed by 
communist superpowers was endemic to Southern Africa at the time and the support of 
liberation movements by Rhodesia’s neighbours crippled its military prowess over time. 
This was possibly the greatest cause for Smith’s willingness to restart majority rule 
discussions from the mid-1970s onward, a process accelerated by the insistence of 
Vorster and Kissinger that majority rule being given to moderate African parties was 
vital to avoiding the further radicalisation of Rhodesian blacks in light of these changes 
in the region.13 Onslow argues that the 1975 independence of Angola and Mozambique 
was central to this decline in Rhodesian stability and security as it led to the country’s 
Eastern border becoming a trafficking point for rebel forces and supplies, whilst Soviet-
Cuban intervention in Angola so soon after independence led to a very powerful 
realisation that the Cold War was much closer to Rhodesia than it had ever been 
before. The great weight of this issue is supported from a military point of view by 
Arbuckle who reinforces the importance of the Mozambique border to guerillas as an 
entry point into Rhodesia,14 whilst suggesting that the socialisation of several of 
Rhodesia’s neighbours contributed to the proliferation of anti-government dissidents 
throughout both the armed and civilian populations.15 
The central and landlocked position of Rhodesia within the region created 
insurmountable problems, as their neighbours turned against them, and made border 
controls incredibly difficult; a problem identified as early as 1974 by the Portuguese 
Prime Minister, who stated that the withdrawal of Portugal from its Southern African 
colonies would create an economic threat effective and immediate because of socialist 
governments in these countries preventing Rhodesia from their use.16 This weak 
tactical placement of Rhodesia was exploited from the early 1970s by FROLIZI17 who 
infiltrated the country from points where the borders of Mozambique and the also-
13  Hargreaves, John D. Decolonization in Africa. 241.
14  Arbuckle, Thomas. "Rhodesian Bush War Strategies and Tactics: An Assessment." The 
RUSI Journal 124, no. 4 (1979): 27-33. 31.
15  Arbuckle, Thomas. "Rhodesian Bush War Strategies and Tactics: An Assessment." 31-32.
16  Dr. Caetano, the Portuguese Prime Minister speaking in 1973. Cited in Davidson, Basil. 
"South Africa and Portugal." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 4.2 (1974): 9-20. 16.
17  The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, a short-lived militant group consisted of ZANU 
and ZAPU members which existed from 1971 to 1974, when it was integrated into the UANC 
and eventually turned to support of the Internal Settlement
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hostile Zambia met with Rhodesia;18 there is also a suggestion by Kirk that FROLIZI, 
ZANU and ZAPU agreed to work together to use this multitude of borders to their 
advantage wherein each would take a region of the country and would use the nearest 
border to infiltrate accordingly.19 
These changes in the region were tied to the weakening of Rhodesia’s position as it 
reinforced a feeling of growing radicalism in the region and led to greater cooperation 
between African nationalist movements, with Guelke arguing that this allowed for the 
widening of the war in Rhodesia.20 A 1975 report by Adelman perhaps best sums up the
loss of these nearby allies to Rhodesia as such; ‘with the decolonization of Angola on 
the west coast and particularly of Mozambique on the east, the white ruled states have 
lost their border guards and been jolted into a realization that major adjustments are 
now needed. Rhodesia has already released black nationalist leaders in return for a 
ceasefire on its borders and has agreed to consultations on eventual black majority 
rule’.21 This report, written in 1975, showed the immediate dangers to Rhodesia from 
these changes in the region. The instant loss of two allied countries, along with the 
increasing socialist leanings of Tanzania, was a great blow to an already weakening 
Rhodesia, and helped to kick-start a renewed process towards majority rule for the 
nation led by ‘ the governments of Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana, along with 
FRELIMO and later the MPLA, (who) met to formulate "a united policy for negotiations 
with the Rhodesian government”’.22 Whilst this agreement was, in its most organised 
form, short lived, it did pave the way for future negotiations involving the Frontline 
States and Rhodesia, and these states would remain politically involved as far as 1980,
at which point their involvement became an issue for the British government to contend 
with as diplomacy with the leaders of African nations became crucial to maintaining the 
Rhodesian ceasefire implemented in 197923 and ensuring peace within the nation after 
18  Kirk, Tony. "Politics and violence in Rhodesia." African Affairs 74, no. 294 (1975): 3-38. 9.
19  Kirk, Tony. "Politics and violence in Rhodesia." 12.
20  Guelke, Adrian. "Southern Africa and the super-powers." International Affairs (Royal Institute
of International Affairs 1944-) 56, no. 4 (1980): 648-664. 655.
21  Adelman, Kenneth L. "Report from Angola." Foreign Affairs 53, no. 3 (1975): 558-574. 574.
22  Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics 
of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe." African Studies Review 36, no. 2 (1993): 31-59. 43.
23  Eg. A discussion between British and Tanzanian diplomats about Tanzanian influence over 
ZANU being used to release some political prisoners. See The National Archives (TNA): PREM 
19/343, ‘Situation in Rhodesia; part 13’. 102.
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the 1980 election, as Frontline State acceptance of its legitimacy was an essential 
prerequisite of achieving stable majority rule.24
Alongside these issues of decolonisation in the region and the growing threat to 
Rhodesia of its increasingly socialist neighbours, were the effects of the Cold War on a 
global scale, which aside from leading to the aforementioned socialisation of several 
political groups within Southern Africa, created a whole host of other problems that 
helped to whittle down Rhodesian resistance to majority rule. The introduction of 
American and British political support against the funds of the USSR, China and their 
allies led to a deepening of the situation in Southern Africa as several groups within the 
region relied on the support of these superpowers. As the Rhodesian UDI continued 
throughout the 1970s, the conflict took on an increasingly global form that all parties 
were willing to exploit. Smith attempted to portray the guerilla war as an East-West 
conflict rather than one between blacks and whites in order to enlist the help of Britain 
and the United States as its position weakened during the late 1970s.25 In contrast, the 
Angolan conflict saw Cuban26 and Soviet involvement in Southern Africa grow to an all 
time high as an attempt to counteract the links that China had previously established in 
the region during the early years of the decade and to minimise the potential for growth 
in Western influence.27 
In 1977, the President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere wrote that any direct military action 
from a foreign government in Rhodesia would lead to even further globalisation of the 
war, as nationalist groups would be forced to seek assistance from communist states. 
With this, the United States and Britain would be unable to prevent the war from 
becoming ‘internationalised’,28 which occurred at a greater rate during the late 1970s 
shifts in the structure of global politics. The widening of relations between the Soviet 
24  Eg. Consultations with Mozambique over whether the 1980 election would be accepted as 
legitimate See The National Archives (TNA): PREM 19/345, ‘Situation in Rhodesia; security 
issues in countryside; intimidation allegations during elections; part 15’. 7.
25  Guelke, Adrian. "Southern Africa and the super-powers." 657
26  Lowry, Donal. "The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 
1920s–1980." Cold War History 7, no. 2 (2007): 169-194. 186.
27  Guelke, Adrian. "Southern Africa and the super-powers." 658.
28  Nyerere, Julius K. "America and Southern Africa." Foreign Affairs 55, no. 4 (1977): 671-684. 
679
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Union and China29 led to ZANU and ZAPU each having a different communist 
superpower funding and backing them. This led to inevitable competition between the 
two countries that added to the existing East-West tensions in the region and helped to 
intensify competition for influence and control over the region.30 ZANU in particular 
framed the conflict in terms of East-West relations and that of socialism against 
‘imperialism’ (here defined as Soviet or Western advances of power in the region),31 
partly due to its political philosophies and also partly as a way to ensure the support of 
its Chinese allies, who were worried about Soviet influence over the older and more 
established ZAPU, along with FRELIMO in Mozambique; this was China’s reason for 
backing groups such as ZANU due to their rivalry with Soviet backed organisations.32 
This widening of conflict in Africa to become more internationalised entrenched 
Rhodesia’s position and ensured its isolation as the super powers struggled for 
influence within the continent. A fear of China, the USSR and the Western powers was 
that they might ‘back the wrong horse’33 in a conflict led to a constant state of 
competition between these powers. The aim was to support the most successful 
movement(s) in any given country, with this Sino-Soviet divide being particularly 
effective in Rhodesia as Tanzania, FRELIMO and ZANU worked in tandem under the 
support of the Chinese government.34 
Furthermore, the strong anti-communist stance of the Rhodesian government that 
followed these changes within Africa and the increasingly partisan nature of political 
struggle within the continent essentially sealed Rhodesia’s political fate according to 
Lowry, who suggests that this strict adherence to an anti-communist position made 
compromise between the government and Socialist rebels incredibly difficult.35 The 
Rhodesian Front used propaganda portraying white Rhodesians as the people who 
29  Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics 
of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe." 35.
30  Guelke, Adrian. "Southern Africa and the super-powers." 649.
31  Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics 
of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe." 42.
32  Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics 
of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe." 40.
33  Barratt, John, 25th February 1981. ‘The Soviet Union and Southern Africa’ (speech made at 
the Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs, 25 February 
1981) 17.
34  Barratt, John, 25th February 1981. ‘The Soviet Union and Southern Africa’ 10.
35  Lowry, Donal. "The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 
1920s–1980." 169.
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‘once made the ‘Great’ of Britain’36 and of the United States as a champion of the free 
world, drawing together themes of anti-Communism and white nationalism that became
unacceptable to many across the world as time progressed into the 1970s. The ‘fall’ of 
previously friendly Mozambique and Angola was a turning point for this use of 
Communism as a spectre haunting Rhodesia in propaganda, with leader of the 
Rhodesian Armed Forces General Peter Walls proclaiming that the country would not 
‘be pushed around or surrender to any Marxist-inspired land grab’.37 
This opposition only intensified further as time passed and Jimmy Carter gained power 
in the United States and rejected the reforms of the Internal Settlement for failing to 
include the guerilla-led political groups in the nation,38 which stemmed from a fear of 
further Cuban intervention in the region and the possibility of Rhodesia becoming a fully
fledged Cold War crisis.39 The propaganda used in Rhodesia assisted this notion of the 
conflict as becoming fully entrenched in the global Cold War climate and led to the 
Western powers becoming reluctant to assist Smith in maintaining any degree of power
if it was to be at the expense of security in the region as a whole. From early on, 
Smith’s propaganda enforced this feeling within Rhodesia and led to an ‘embattled, 
besieged… mentality’40 which, whilst initially effective at maintaining harmony within the
white settler population of the country, did have the effect of bringing the Cold War 
closer to home and enforcing in the minds of the superpowers a need to bring 
Rhodesia to majority rule as quickly as possible.  This Cold War climate led to the once 
passive Britain to the forefront as it realised that a solution to the crisis on its own terms
was necessary as the USSR and China closed in on complete influence within 
Southern Africa; Britain could not afford to ‘lose’ Rhodesia to Socialist rebels through a 
military coup, a possibility which was seeming ever more possible as the 1970s 
progressed.
36  Lowry, Donal. "The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 
1920s–1980." 178.
37 Lowry, Donal. "The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 
1920s–1980." 187.
38  Mitchell, Nancy. "Tropes of the Cold War: Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia." Cold War History 7, 
no. 2 (2007): 263-283. 263.
39  Mitchell, Nancy. "Tropes of the Cold War: Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia." 264.
40  Onslow, Sue, ed. Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation. Routledge, 
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The issues faced in Rhodesia during this time were further compounded by the 
emergence of pan-African sentiment amongst some in countries neighbouring 
Rhodesia, leading to further isolation of the white minority in the face of a more 
organised and homogeneous opponent than ever before. This grew over the course of 
the 1970s and was led by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, who maintained a 
strong stance against white rule in Rhodesia, believing that cooperation within Africa 
could lead to the collapse of Smith’s government. Kaunda attempted this whilst 
remaining relatively non-aligned within the greater Cold War, and was a major figure in 
the rise of pan-Africanism during this time. This was a factor that greatly weakened 
Rhodesia as her enemies were now increasingly united in opposition for a wider range 
of reasons than before, with either Cold War or pan-African concerns often at the 
forefront of anti-Smith thought. Zambia, in maintaining this non-aligned stance, held 
sanctions against Rhodesia at great cost to Zambia’s own domestic economy41 whilst 
Kaunda himself recalled telling Mugabe and Nkomo that if they refused to attend the 
1979 peace talks, he would withdraw support for their armed and political struggle.42 
This goal of black liberation and African unity was consistently followed by Kaunda and 
helped to weaken Smith’s defence of his rogue state as he often acted as an 
intermediary between black and white political actors in Southern Africa.
Zambia carried much of the burden of sanctions against Rhodesia despite its own 
economy struggling against the falling price of copper and the rising price of oil43 and 
encouraged an ultimately failed round of independence discussions as early as 1975 
between Ian Smith and African political groups. Hargreaves further suggests that this 
was a failure due to the expansion of the Rhodesia crisis into a wider, more Cold War 
influenced conflict that by 1975 had not reached a tipping point from which Smith’s 
government would be forced into majority rule. He points to 1976 as this turning point 
due to the rise of Mugabe within ZANU that was helped along by efforts from the rulers 
of neighbouring states who were working to unite the ‘bitterly divided nationalist and 
guerilla leaders’.44 However, once these elements had been united under a banner of 
41  Onslow, Sue, ed. Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation. 5.
42  Charlton, Michael. The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia.
London: Blackwell (1991) Cited in Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National 
Liberation: ZANU and the Politics of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe." 51.
43  Hargreaves, John D. Decolonization in Africa. 241.
44  Hargreaves, John D. Decolonization in Africa. 241-2.
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socialism and black liberation, Kaunda was able to utilise his pan-African stance to help
peace talks along during the 1970s - his non-aligned viewpoint helping to temper the 
more radical nationalist elements within the Frontline States and Rhodesia in order to 
achieve a reasonable independence agreement. Furthermore, Reed states that it took 
Kaunda’s intervention to convince Britain to allow PF involvement in the post Lancaster 
House government at a time where Britain and Muzorewa were equally reluctant to give
the less moderate Africans within Rhodesia a political voice. Kaunda’s involvement led 
to Britain allowing the PF to play a role in elections and promised that guerilla forces 
would be given the same rights as the Rhodesian forces during any ceasefire- a vital 
requirement to keeping peace during the 1980 election.45 
Kaunda’s non-aligned and pan-African views allowed him to be seen as a somewhat 
unbiased negotiator, as evidence by his changing viewpoints on ZANU. Kaunda at first 
tolerated ZANU,46 before changing his viewpoint in 1974 as he sought a solution to the 
Rhodesia problem that could have mitigated instability in the region following the 
decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique.47 This relationship reached a low point in 
March 1975 when Herbert Chitepo48 was assassinated in Zambia, leading to the arrest 
of many ZANLA militants and ZANU members in the country as Kaunda blamed the 
assassination on ‘enemies of Zimbabwean unity’.49 This relationship was not to thaw 
until 1978, as Mugabe’s attempts to re-establish ZANU as a force in international 
affairs50 coincided with the deeply unpopular Internal Settlement, leading Kaunda to 
once again become heavily involved in the crisis as a mediator between Britain and the 
more radical Zimbabwean political parties. The holding of the 1979 Lusaka Conference 
in Lusaka as a vehicle for lobbying Britain to allow these parties to participate in the 
following election was an example of this renewed involvement and was a statement 
Kaunda’s commitment to democratic black liberation in Rhodesia. The growth of pan-
45  Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics 
of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe." 52.
46  Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics 
of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe." 41.
47  Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics 
of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe." 43.
48  Leader of ZANU until his death in March 1975. 
49  Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics 
of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe." 44.
50  Reed, William Cyrus. "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the Politics 
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African sentiment in those invested in the Rhodesia crisis allowed for a greater degree 
of cooperation between those in the continent, and offered these actors more power 
over any settlement. This arguably led partly to Britain’s anxiety over legitimacy during 
Lancaster House and beyond, as the British government knew the growing influence 
that the Frontline States had in the region.
The situation in Southern Africa and Rhodesia by 1979 was one featuring a number of 
nations and political groups exhausted from a decade of political, economic, and 
military conflict. This led to an incentive for these groups to find a solution and stability 
emerging and offered an entry point for the British government back into the political 
future of Rhodesia. The general climate of economic decline and political uncertainty 
placed the British government in a prime position for expanding its influence in the 
region through careful diplomacy in order to gain allies in the region whilst improving its 
international reputation through the successful decolonisation of Rhodesia.
The 1978 Internal Settlement
The road to majority rule and the removal of Smith as Prime Minister of Rhodesia, 
along with a renewed involvement in the nation for Great Britain, came in 1978 courtesy
of the Internal Settlement, an agreement between the white-led Rhodesian Front party 
(henceforth RF) and Bishop Muzorewa’s United African National Council (UANC). Up 
until this point Rhodesia had been subsiding as an isolated rogue state within Southern 
Africa, using its relative prosperity compared to its neighbours51 at the time to withstand 
sanctions placed upon it throughout the 1970s. Despite this relative modernity, 
Rhodesia was increasingly economically, politically and militarily isolated by the late 
1970s due to the the influence of the Cold War climate, growing pan-Africanism and the
reopening of the Zambia-Rhodesia border.52 The loss of several key allies in the region 
51  Zimbabwe had a GDP per capita of $916 by 1980, a number that compares favourably to 
that of Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania and Angola (data only available from 1988 and 
1985 onwards, respectively, but with these values far below Rhodesia’s value for 1980). Only 
South Africa and Namibia had a significantly higher GDP per capita than Rhodesia in 1978-80, 
with Botswana’s sitting marginally higher at just over $1000 per capita. Whilst these figures are 
not sufficient to show wealth distribution or modernisation in these nations, they do provide the 
insight that Rhodesia had a level of wealth as a nation that was a degree above that of its 
neighbours. Data from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?view=chart, 
accessed 14 March 2016
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was also an important factor as South Africa began to ‘turn the screws’53 economically 
and politically in a bid to become ‘the regional hegemon’54 in the new climate of 
Southern Africa. Whilst South Africa continued to covertly finance non-aligned Africans 
within Rhodesia during the 1979 election, the fear of renewed pressure from South 
Africa was enough to prevent a regression of Rhodesian political thought away from 
allowing majority rule.55 As Rhodesia’s reliance on South Africa for import and export 
reached an all time high, its allies in Africa diminished rapidly in number.56 
The confluence of these factors placed a great deal of pressure upon Ian Smith’s 
government as the United States and Britain began to put more pressure on Smith to 
accept a multi-racial settlement from 1977 onwards. The Internal Settlement was a 
reaction to this new involvement and to the Anglo-American proposals of 1977. These 
proposals were considered unacceptable by Smith due to their insistence on removing 
the army from white control during constitutional discussions which had the potential to 
allow militant African groups excess bargaining power.57 Smith knew that he had to act 
in tandem with moderate Africans in order to reach a settlement acceptable to him; by 
agreeing to hand over power without external influence, Smith believed he had 
‘outmaneuvered the British government’58 and would be able to transition to a majority 
rule that was at the very least acceptable to those outside Rhodesia whilst remaining 
advantageous to Rhodesian whites. As such, Smith met with moderate Africans such 
as Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole to discuss an agreement that would allow 
for the transition of power to the black majority whilst avoiding politically empowering 
militant Africans within the country. 
52  Reopened in 1978 due to economic pressure on Zambia; whilst this did allow some trade 
between the two nations, it also eased the transport of militants from Zambia into northern areas
of Rhodesia. Explained in Minter, William, and Elizabeth Schmidt. "When sanctions worked: The
case of Rhodesia reexamined." African Affairs 87, no. 347 (1988): 207-237. 213
53  Minter, William, and Elizabeth Schmidt. "When sanctions worked: The case of Rhodesia 
reexamined." 228
54  Onslow, Sue, ed. Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation. 11
55  Minter, William, and Elizabeth Schmidt. "When sanctions worked: The case of Rhodesia 
reexamined." 229
56  Minter, William, and Elizabeth Schmidt. "When sanctions worked: The case of Rhodesia 
reexamined." 227
57  Day, John. "The Rhodesian internal settlement." The World Today 34, no. 7 (1978): 268-276.
272
58  Day, John. "The Rhodesian internal settlement." 273
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These discussions resulted in the Internal Settlement, signed in March 1978, and would
lead to the election of 1979, which would be central in determining the fate of 
Rhodesian decolonisation; whilst Smith was determined to allow majority rule only on 
his own terms, international recognition would be difficult to achieve, and the legitimacy 
of any future governments would be carefully scrutinised. This signalled Britain truly 
becoming further involved in the fate of the nation, as the unpopular settlement faced 
strong opposition from the international community. By this point Rhodesia was in a 
precarious position and was slipping ever closer to collapse, either economic or 
military; the ill-fated 1978 Internal Settlement was a last chance for Smith to attempt to 
allow majority rule only on these terms. It was at this point that the British  government 
realised that its involvement could could not only solve the Rhodesia crisis from a 
colonial and moral standpoint, but also from a tactical standpoint as a legitimate 
transition to majority rule with a moderate government would assist British interests in 
the region. Whilst this would not occur in 1978 or 1979, the Internal Settlement 
signalled an end to the worst period of the Rhodesia crisis and allowed for a concerned 
Britain to increase its involvement in the nation. The new-found concessions to majority 
rule made by Smith allowed the British government negotiating power with regards to 
this, something that had previously been impossible due to Smith's strong stance that 
caused negotiation to be incredibly difficult. 
Chapter 1: The 1979 election, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, and
Lancaster House
The April 1979 election was fraught with complications and issues that had the 
undesirable effect of harming its legitimacy with a wide range of governments and 
political groups, both Rhodesian and foreign. Some of these issues stemmed from the 
conduct, mechanics and process of the election itself, but most were resultant of the 
1978 Internal Settlement and its constitution implemented by Ian Smith and Bishop 
Muzorewa. This agreement came into fruition from talks between these men as heads 
of the largest59 white and black political parties in the nation. Whilst this was a step 
forward in many ways for Rhodesia in terms of progress towards black political 
enfranchisement and equality, it did include clauses seen by some international critics 
59  Whilst ZANU and ZAPU were more popular than these parties, the PF parties were banned 
until after the 1979 election
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as outside the norm for majority rule constitutions60, such as provisions for whites to 
retain a large degree of control over parliament and institutions such as the army and 
police. These included ‘a number of seats reserved for whites’, which provided 
‘extensive powers of veto’61 and further allowed the white minority ‘continued control 
over the army’.62 Additionally, only whites could vote on this constitution.63 Whilst the 
1979 election did succeed in its creation of a black majority parliament as a result of the
enfranchisement of almost three million black Rhodesians for the first time, international
observers failed to acknowledge the election as legitimate due to issues raised by 
deficits in the Constitution. 
The key issues that caused a number of international governments to question the 
results of the election and its resulting government were the exclusion of the Patriotic 
Front from the Internal Settlement and election, and a belief that whites still held power 
in the House of Assembly that was disproportionate to their position as a demographic 
minority consisting of four percent of the population,64 with 100,000 eligible to vote65. 
Criticism of these issues greatly outranked any concerns about the election itself on an 
international scale, as for opponents of the Internal Settlement any election resulting 
from its Constitution was illegitimate despite the mechanical successes of the election. 
Whilst the election did have issues relating to intimidation, coercion and its mechanics 
for preventing voter fraud, on an international scale these were little more than 
additional proof of the election’s lack of legitimacy. The known issues regarding the 
1978 Internal Settlement and its resulting constitution were more than enough to create
the level of international backlash to place the election under insurmountable scrutiny.
The consequence of this was that the Rhodesian election was seen as illegitimate by 
the vast majority of international governments, with the UN Security Council pre-
emptively condemning the election in March whilst commending the Frontline States for
their continued opposition of the Rhodesian government.66 This was supported by a 
further Resolution that swiftly followed the election and denounced the results of the 
60  The National Archives (TNA): PREM 19/106, ‘Situation in Rhodesia: Elections, April 1979; 
part 1’. 16
61  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 205
62  The National Archives (TNA): PREM 19/107, ‘Situation in Rhodesia; part 2’. 32
63  (TNA): PREM 19/107. 8
64  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 205
65  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 244
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election and the Rhodesian constitution, describing the election results as ‘null and 
void’ and appealing to UN members to refuse recognition of the Rhodesian 
government.67 This precedent was followed by the international community, with 
members of the Commonwealth and the Frontline States among those to immediately 
condemn the election and its results, whilst Britain, the USA and France were among 
nations to abstain from immediately deciding on whether to recognise the government’s
legitimacy. Without international recognition of the election, the chances of Rhodesia’s 
government facing continued sanctions and guerilla warfare were high. The pressure 
placed on the Rhodesian government by this international lack of recognition was what 
ultimately led to the British government to become further involved in future 
Constitutional talks and election planning in Rhodesia.
Whilst issues with the election itself were important to solidifying international opinion 
against the results of the 1979 election, by viewing these diplomatic and government 
responses it is possible to understand the general discontent with the Internal 
Settlement and its constitution, and how the illegitimate nature of these ultimately 
subjected the election to insurmountable levels of international scorn from the 
beginning. By doing so, it will also be possible to explain the ways in which diplomacy 
allowed for the implementation of policy over time, and the ways in which this ultimately
prevented the 1980 election from receiving the same degree of criticism, despite 
sharing many of the mechanical issues as in 1979. The failure of the 1979 election 
allowed the British government a mandate to use diplomacy from afar in order to 
achieve a settlement. The concession of Smith to majority rule had provided the 
beginnings of this transition, whilst the continued commitment to sanctions by the UN 
ensured that the Rhodesian government had little choice other than to allow British 
involvement, knowing that any internally organised election had little chance of 
international recognition.
66  United Nations Security Council Resolution 445, 8 March 1979. https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/370/59/IMG/NR037059.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 19
May 2016
67  United Nations Security Council Resolution 448, 30 April 1979. https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/370/62/IMG/NR037062.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 19
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The election mechanics, process and structure
The 1979 election was based upon the new Constitution of Rhodesia that had been 
agreed upon by Ian Smith of the RF, Bishop Muzorewa of the UANC, Ndabaningi 
Sithole of ZANU, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau of ZUPO as key to discussions. Smith 
called for these talks primarily due to a need to end or lessen the intensity of the 
guerilla war, due to the economic and social impact it was having on Rhodesia. The 
constitution was Smith’s way of transitioning power to the black majority whilst keeping 
major concessions for whites, and hoped that despite this, Rhodesia would be 
recognised internationally. The key ways in which white power was to be maintained 
was by having an Executive Council with one black and one white minister sharing 
each department of government, by allowing whites to hold twenty eight seats in 
government for at least the next 10 years, and to prevent black influence in the police 
and army by stating that these must be ‘maintained… free from political interference’.68 
The constitution was a way for give Africans genuine majority rule whilst ‘prolonging 
white management of the principal institutions of the state’.69 As such, the 1979 election
was seen within Rhodesian politics as not only a vote on who was to be in government,
but also as a way of legitimising the Internal Settlement’s constitution. An argument in 
favour of the election in its immediate aftermath was that high voter turnout showed 
tacit approval of the constitution, whilst arguments condemning its results often focused
on the unjust constitution that it was based upon.
The election itself took place during April 1979, with one hundred total seats to be 
contested. Voting for the seventy-two black (known as common) roll seats in the 
Assembly taking place from 17-21 April, with this vote being counted on 23 and 24 
April. The election for twenty of the white seats took place earlier in the month, on the 
10 April.70 After this, all elected members of the House would vote on 8 further white 
members, meaning that the 100 strong Assembly was divided between seventy-two 
black and twenty-eight white members as detailed in the Internal Settlement, with eight 
of these white members not elected by the public. These eight not elected by the public
68  Day, John. "The Rhodesian internal settlement." 273.
69  Day, John. "The Rhodesian internal settlement." 273.
70  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 153.
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were voted for after the main election, and were not divided by constituency, but rather 
all running in opposition, with the eight receiving the most votes being elected. 
The 1977 elections had seen an Assembly of sixty-six seats, fifty of which were on the 
white roll with eight black roll seats,71 both of which contained property qualifications, 
and eight Tribal seats voted for by the Chiefs of the native African tribes in Rhodesia. 
Citizenship was also a requirement for voting, and as a result only 83,762 whites voted 
in 1977, largely due to the fact that many never took dual citizenship after emigrating, 
usually from Britain or South Africa.72 Only 7,468 black Rhodesians voted in 1977, with 
this being 0.2 percent of the overall African population of the country, and estimations 
suggesting that around 50,000 would have been eligible to vote.73
The country was split up into constituencies, with these differing between the black and 
white rolls. For the black roll, Rhodesia was split into eight regions,74 each of which was
further allocated a number of seats for election- for example, the province of Victoria 
was split into ten constituencies, whilst Mashonaland West was split into six.75 This 
depended on size and population density of the different regions, with cities being split 
into several constituencies as is the norm in nations such as Britain. For the white roll, 
new constituencies were created based on amalgamations of pre-Internal Settlement 
constituencies due to there being thirty fewer white seats than before. This resulted in 
fewer constituencies overall, but with these new constituencies each covering a 
broader area than before.
The results of the election saw Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front winning all twenty white 
seats voted on by the public, and all eight seats chosen by the Assembly on the 7 May. 
Of all these seats, only four were contested and all of these were won easily by the RF 
candidates.76 For the common roll, fifty-one seats were won by Bishop Muzorewa’s 
71  'Smith Keeps power in Rhodesia’, 31 August 1977 
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UANC, with this resulting in an overall majority in parliament. Twelve seats were won by
Ndabanagi Sithole’s ZANU, with the UNFP winning nine seats.77 This meant that the 
government was headed by Bishop Muzorewa as Prime Minister, heading a cabinet 
made up of twelve black and five white ministers. Ian Smith held a position in the 
cabinet as ‘minister without portfolio’ which allowed him to remain politically involved in 
the government whilst appearing to have fully conceded the bulk of his political 
influence and involvement to Muzorewa, leading to Nkomo suggesting that Smith was 
rather ‘the minister with all the portfolios’.78 The composition of this post Internal 
Settlement government did, however, have a greater proportion of black cabinet and 
constituency members than there had been previously. 
The parties of the 1979 election
The only white party in Rhodesia to field candidates in the election was Ian Smith’s ever
present RF, with the four contested constituencies having independent opposition. The 
RF was formed in 1962 under Winston Field, with leadership being assumed by Smith 
from April 1964 onwards. From the 1962 election until its dissolution in 1981, the RF 
was the dominant party in Rhodesia, a title that it had taken from the previous main 
white party, the United Federal Party. From the point of UDI in 1965, the RF was 
practically unopposed for the white roll vote, and was the leading party in Rhodesia 
under Smith until 1979. Due to being unopposed in most constituencies and winning all 
opposed constituencies, the RF won almost one hundred percent of all white roll votes 
in the 1979 election.
The United African National Council was a party in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe from 1979 
to 1994, and was led during the 1979 election by Bishop Muzorewa. Being a relative 
moderate, Muzorewa was chosen by Smith for constitutional talks and was key to the 
agreements secured at the Internal Settlement. Muzorewa’s moderacy was seen to 
have been based around his ‘penchant for organisation… (and lack of desperation) for 
power’79 and his relative lack of strong rhetoric or idealism when compared to Mugabe 
and Nkomo. Due to this, Muzorewa and his party were the most popular legal black 
77  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 185-7.
78  Moorcraft, Paul. ‘Rhodesia’s war of independence.’ History Today 40, no. 9 (1990) 
http://www.historytoday.com/paul-moorcraft/rhodesias-war-independence. Accessed 10 
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political organisation in Rhodesia at the time, with the Patriotic Front garnering more 
overall support but being unable to win any seats in the 1979 election due to still being 
embroiled in ongoing war against the state. This popularity was reflected in the 1979 
election as the UANC won enough seats for a majority, a total of fifty-one seats, or 
1,212,639 votes and 67.27 percent of the popular vote.80 The UANC were most 
successful in the Western, Eastern and Central Mashonaland regions, in which they 
won all twenty one seats and 80.67 percent of the vote.81 Whilst contested in all regions
and constituencies, the UANC were generally dominant in the election, losing only in 
Matabeleland South with only one seat to the UNFP’s 3.82 
The next most successful party in the election was Zimbabwe African National Union, 
led by Ndabaningi Sithole. This was an offshoot of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU, which had 
at this point temporarily joined with Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU to form the patriotic front. 
This split had begun in 1975 after the assassination of the previous leader and party 
founder along with Sithole, Herbert Chitepo. This split was due to Mugabe’s belief in 
continued violent struggle and the use of guerilla warfare at times targeting the civilian 
population. Sithole was a believer in non-violent political progress towards majority rule,
and his ZANU became a legitimate party in Rhodesia during the Internal Settlement. 
Meanwhile, Mugabe continued to lead ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU, illegally 
against the government. Ultimately, Sithole’s ZANU was to lose in the 1980 election to 
Mugabe’s newly legal ZANU-PF party, failing to win any seats in 1980 and dissolving 
thereafter. In the 1979 election, ZANU won twelve seats and an overall 262,928 votes, 
or 14.58 percent of the vote.83 ZANU failed to win any regions overall, but performed 
fairly well in Manicaland, Victoria and Midlands, winning ten seats out of a possible 
thirty one in these regions. Whilst failing to take any sort of lead over the UANC, ZANU 
were consistent across most regions as the second biggest party.84
The only other black party to win any common roll seats was the United National 
Federal Party. This party was lead by Chief Kayisa Ndiweni, who had previously been a
79  Sithole, Masipula. "Is Zimbabwe Poised on a Liberal Path? The State and Prospects of the 
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part of the Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation and had served as Cabinet 
Ministers in the previous RF government. In November 1978 Ndiweni left ZUPO to form
the UNFP, winning nine seats in the 1979 election but failing to win any in 1980. The 
UNFP won 194,446 votes, or 10.97 percent of the vote,85 and were most successful in 
Matabeleland North and South, where they won a total of seven seats out of a possible 
fifteen, and an overall majority in Matabeleland South, where they won 58.90 percent of
the popular vote.86
There were two other parties on the Common Roll, neither of which won any seats. 
ZUPO, a party that had been involved in the Internal Settlement talks before Ndiweni’s 
defection to the UNFP, was led by Chief Chirau. ZUPO contested in the 1979 election, 
but saw declining support and dissolved before the 1980 election. ZUPO won a total of 
114,570 votes, or 6.36 percent of the vote, but this was spread relatively evenly over 
the different regions and resulted in the party failing to win any seats.87 The other party 
to contest the election was the National Democratic Union. This party only contested in 
Mashonaland East, and won 18,175 votes in this region. Overall the NDU won exactly 
one percent of the vote and failed to win any seats.88 
These results handed Muzorewa's UANC an overwhelming majority within the common
roll section of government, with Smith's RF being the only other party in the nation to 
receive a similar number of votes. The overwhelming victory for Muzorewa's party was 
not, however, seen as conclusive proof of a black majority government in the country 
due to the exclusion of the PF, a vital issue for the Frontline States which increased 
their commitment to securing a settlement that included these groups. This 
commitment, alongside Smith's unwillingness to be seen as personally legitimising the 
PF, allowed the British government an entry point into the situation. A settlement 
overseen by the British government with the blessing of the Frontline States would be 
viewed far less controversially by both black and white Rhodesians than an internal 
settlement or regime change through nationalist military action.
85  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 185.
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Polling and voter eligibility
Aside from the parties voted for in this election, there were 66,319 spoiled papers and a
total of 1,802,758 votes, with spoiled papers making up 3.55 percent of all votes. This 
meant that around 64.5 percent of eligible adults voted in the election, including those 
who spoiled their ballots- a relatively high turnout considering the circumstances.89 This 
figure is based upon Rhodesian authorities’ estimates of the electorate as being around
2.9 million people, with Lord Goronwy-Roberts estimating a higher number of 3.5 
million prior to the election.90 These figures indicate that between fifty two percent and 
64.5 percent of people who were eligible voted in the election, with the figure of 64.5 
percent being given immediately after the election by the Rhodesian Authorities.91
The 1979 election was the first in Rhodesia that allowed voting by all black citizens, 
after the January 1979 Constitutional Referendum saw whites vote eighty five percent 
in favour of enfranchisement of all citizens regardless of income, wealth or race as had 
previously been barriers to voting.92 The two requirements to be able to vote in this 
election were residence in Rhodesia for at least two years, and to be over eighteen 
years of age. The first requirement was checked by using immigration documents that 
would be handed to polling station attendants before voting. The issue of people who 
were not from Rhodesia being able to vote despite failing to fulfil this criteria was 
relatively minor, as due to martial law and the use of locals at polling stations deception 
of this kind would have been difficult to achieve. Returning residents and those who 
had immigrated legally would have had passports or immigration documents to prove 
their eligibility.93 The issue of under-age voters was slightly more pressing, with the 
National Electoral Directorate estimating that there were 750,000 fourteen to seventeen
year olds who could attempt to pass for eighteen in order to vote.94 The main ways in 
which this was combated by the authorities was to ask for documents from those who 
89  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 185.
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91  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 185.
92  Data on 1979 Constitutional referendum in Rhodesia.  
http://africanelections.tripod.com/zw.html#1979_Constitutional_Referendum. Accessed 10 
August 2016.
93  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 177.
94  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 178.
30
looked under eighteen or were acting suspiciously, to ask all voters their age (some 
were unaware of the requirement or were swept up in the excitement and just wanted 
to vote), and through the use of school teachers to identify local students who were 
under eighteen.95 
As this was the first time that most blacks had been able to vote in Rhodesia, there was
no electoral roll for the almost three million potential voters. This posed a problem of 
duplicate voting and electoral fraud. The way in which these problems were addressed 
was through the use of invisible marking fluid which showed up under a certain kind of 
light. This fluid was generally successful as it was indelible and prevented double voting
in a simple to understand manner. The only issue with the fluid was that it was alien to 
many, and some found it worrying to see their hands change colour under the light. This
was generally explained by those manning the voting booth in order to minimise worry, 
and some polling stations were willing to demonstrate to voters how the process 
worked when necessary.96 So whilst the lack of voter registration was certainly a 
concern, the effectiveness of the ink solution at least worked effectively to minimise the 
possibility of duplicate voting.
The Boyd, Drinkwater, Palley, and Chitnis reports
The 'Boyd' and 'Drinkwater' reports on the 1979 election were published in mid May 
1979 for the British government’s use in assessing the election’s successes and 
failings. The Boyd report was published by Lord Boyd, an observer sent with a five-man
team of helpers by the British government to produce a report that could be used 
officially to prove the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of the Internal Settlement government, 
or simply as an aid for the British government in policy formation.97 The 'Drinkwater' 
report was by John Drinkwater QC, who travelled with Boyd to Rhodesia, but produced 
a separate report and did not necessarily experience the exact same series of events 
as Boyd.98 This was not an official document, but was given to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office by Mr Drinkwater as an addition to the conclusions found in 
Boyd’s report. These reports were sent to the Prime Minister for inspection around a 
95  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 178.
96  (TNA): PREM 19/106. 177.
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month after the election, with both reports being circulated internally on 16 May.99 
These reports were read by the Prime Minister, but were not published as government 
White Papers, as they were ‘not compiled under government auspices’.100 Despite this, 
the reports were made generally available, with copies placed in the Parliamentary 
libraries, copies released to the press by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 
with copies sent abroad to other governments and other interested parties.101
The general findings of these reports were that the elections in Rhodesia were free and
fair, and that the government was, by extension, legitimate.102 The main areas that 
these reports focused on were the exclusion of the PF, electoral intimidation or 
coercion, and the voting process itself. On the exclusion of the PF, the 'Boyd report' 
concluded that it was the ‘avowed intent of both (PF) factions to wreck the election’,103 
and that their exclusion was at least partially self-inflicted. Boyd states that ‘the 
absence of candidates cannot be held to invalidate the election unless they were 
prevented from standing’,104 and that Mugabe and Nkomo could have ‘taken part in the 
consultations leading to… the constitution and… could have returned and freely taken 
part in the election’.105 Likewise, Drinkwater stated that the PF’s refusal to participate 
was a political decision, and that he would not comment on its ‘rightness or 
wrongness’.106 On electoral intimidation and coercion, Boyd and Drinkwater found that 
the main blame was to be placed on the PF guerillas, with infractions by white 
employers and the government to be incidental for the most part. Boyd found that 
guerilla attacks ‘eroded the Government's authority’ and left only ‘fear and superstition, 
and blind obedience’.107 Similarly, coercion was found to have been an issue that, whilst
not irrelevant, was not sufficient in invalidating the election results. The main concern 
with regards to this issue was coercion by white employers on black voters. Boyd and 
Drinkwater found that due to the secretive nature of the vote, employees could ‘spoil 
their paper or leave it blank’,108 and addressed the issue of employees being 
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transported to polling stations by their employers as a positive factor that allowed for a 
higher voter turnout.109 Despite this, Boyd did suggest that ‘it would be a brave 
(employee) who would not join the others on the truck’.110 Despite these concerns, Boyd
and Drinkwater reported the election as being a success due to the fulfilment of four 
objectives set internally by Rhodesia for the election.111 Due to the general fulfilment of 
these, Boyd stated that ‘in our view the elections were "fair" in the sense that the 
electoral machinery was fairly conducted… (after applying) the strictest Western 
European criteria’.112 
Dr. Claire Palley, a Rhodesian constitutional lawyer, also published two reports on the 
election in May and July. The first of these was incomplete and brief compared to the 
latter, which was able to take conclusions from other reports in order to form a more 
coherent viewpoint.113 These were not government sanctioned reports and were written 
by Palley as an independent observer for the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations. As such, limited copies of these exist, and as such a secondary source is 
used in order to examine their conclusions. Palley was most critical of the exclusion of 
the PF, stating that 'no alternative choice was made available to the African people’ who
did not want to vote for any of the internal parties.114 Whilst Palley accepted the 
mechanical successes of the election, she argued that these were largely irrelevant and
that ‘pressures on the voters, regarded as acceptable by the Boyd Report, in fact meant
that the elections were neither free nor fair’.115 Palley argued that ‘a number of changes 
in the electoral law… made it easier for the authorities and politicians to turn out the 
vote’.116 Palley believed that these issues distorted the results of the election and were 
amplified by issues of violence and intimidation, and 'that while each factor on its own 
might not invalidate the election results, the cumulative effect of all the vitiating factors 
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is such as to render the results suspect and unreliable’. Palley concludes that the 
elections were not sufficiently ‘free and fair’, as would be required for legitimate majority
rule.117
Lord Chitnis released his report on the election in May. This report was prepared for 
and published by the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, a cross-party 
parliamentary body that was not directly associated with the government. This report 
was not published by the British government, after a discussion in parliament on 18 
May, in which it was agreed to be placed in the parliament library but was not to be 
considered a government document.118 As with the Palley report, this document was not
widely reproduced, and as such only limited understanding of its exact contents can be 
achieved through secondary materials. Chitnis’ main issues with the election centred 
around what the election stood for, and what people were voting for. He argued that the
election was ‘not about the settlement proposals or constitution (and) the choice facing 
the electorate to determine the nature of the future government was purely an 
illusion’.119 Similarly, he felt that the lack of an anti-settlement campaign and the 
exclusion of the PF showed this and prevented the elections from being a valid 
endorsement of the 1978 constitution.120 Whilst he felt that many did vote for a 
candidate that they wanted, the successes of the election were insufficient proof of ‘a 
valid test of opinion’ when taking into account the election’s myriad issues.121 The other 
issue that condemned the election to illegitimacy for Chitnis was the scale of 
intimidation and coercion in the country. Chitnis argued that according to the Red 
Cross, the election was held in a ‘climate of wanton and persistent cruelty’ and that 
martial law had as much of an impact as guerilla activity in terrorising the population.122 
Chitnis also accepted the crimes of the guerillas, summarising that ‘intimidation and 
coercion were so widespread as to render the election results meaningless’ and that 
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‘the only thing we feel… with any certainty… is that one side was more effective (at 
this) than the other’.123 
Press reaction to the 1979 election was split, both before and after the publication of 
these reports. Colin Brown of The Guardian wrote in mid-May that ‘recognition would 
cost Britain any influence she had in bringing about a ceasefire and would bring 
charges of breach of faith from African Commonwealth countries’.124 Following a 
statement by former British Foreign Secretary David Owen that suggested that 
‘recognition now of the internal constitution would increase soviet influence in Africa’,125 
Brown concluded that ‘Britain must convince Bishop Muzorewa that he had no future 
tied to Mr. Smith.’126 This aligned with an article written by James McManus before the 
election, in which he stated that ‘the exclusion of the Patriotic Front from any settlement
can only guarantee further war’,127 a view shared by The Observer which highlighted 
the ‘international hostility’128 that recognition of Muzorewa would cause despite the 
Boyd report providing ‘justification for recognising Rhodesia’s return to legality’129 in the 
eyes of Thatcher. This article also highlighted the fact that civil war in Rhodesia would 
only end through ‘a political settlement acceptable not only to Bishop Muzorewa, but 
also to the leaders of the Patriotic Front’.130 
Whilst these reports were not vital to influencing British government policy following the 
1979 election, they were relatively widely discussed, with The Observer also covering 
Chitnis’ report and summarising the elections as being ‘seriously challenged’ by this 
report.131 The Times reported perhaps the strongest analysis of election outcomes in 
April, discussing that as ‘many Conservatives… believe that the election provided at 
least as good a legitimation as that enjoyed by many other governments in Africa… it 
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would be immoral and inconsistent of Britain to reject the result’132 in favour of a plan 
that included the PF, ‘especially as this plan has clearly encouraged and endorsed 
guerilla violence’.133 This article also documented the reverse opinion, that as ‘the 
internal settlement is overwhelmingly opposed by black African leaders’,134 Britain could
‘find herself isolated and faced with a real danger that Cuban troops could enter the 
war’, concluding that Thatcher would have to balance ‘the essential justice of the 
Conservative view… against these risks’ and ‘move slowly… by way of intense 
consultations with the Americans and with African governments’.135 The dangers of 
recognition were echoed by ‘outgoing Labour Foreign Office ministers’, who warned 
that ‘recognition of the new regime in Rhodesia could imperil billions of pounds worth of
British trade’136, an article in The Guardian correctly guessing that a boycott was ‘very 
much a possibility’ and would largely be focused ‘in black Africa, led by Nigeria’.137 In 
this article, Hoggart highlighted the growth in trade between Britain and black Africa, 
with Britain selling ‘£1,000 millions of goods to Nigeria’138 in 1978, and ‘trade with 
Tanzania (increasing) from £72 millions to £112 millions’.139 Even this soon after the 
elections, the potential economic and political consequences of British recognition of 
the Muzorewa government were being recognised. As a result, the importance of strong
relations with these nations for the future was understood alongside the necessity for 
careful diplomatic ties with Southern African states. The current and future benefits of 
friendlier economic and political ties with these nations, and the consequences of the 
opposite were becoming clear.
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British government reaction to the 1979 election; Immediate crisis management
Due to the refusal of the international community to recognise the government of 
Rhodesia as legitimate after the 1979 election and the continued commitment to 
guerilla warfare by the Patriotic Front, the British government was forced to react 
quickly to developments in the nation. As the foreign entity most commonly associated 
with the white regime in Rhodesia, many governments across the globe looked to 
Britain with the expectation that the government would immediately condemn the 1978 
constitution and 1979 election, and would quickly work to find a new settlement for 
majority rule. This put a great deal of pressure on the British government, as it was 
precariously balanced between appeasing these nations through quick and decisive 
action whilst successfully negotiating with Ian Smith and the PF- a task that had proven
difficult in the past. The British government’s immediate concerns were to abate the 
anger of those anxious to see the removal of Smith from power as soon as possible, 
whilst ensuring that Rhodesia did not become a state completely consumed by chaos 
and violence through long-term solutions. This need to plan for the long term whilst 
managing diplomatic relation crises in the short term characterised British government 
policy in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 election.
British government diplomacy followed different procedures and approaches depending
on the nation or leader involved. For example, diplomacy with Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia often focused on what Britain could provide 
or withhold in the event of disputes over Rhodesia. This approach was effective due to 
the fact that these nations were economically struggling by the end of the 1970s, and 
had less of a financial incentive to continue action against Britain or Rhodesia than, 
say, Nigeria. Diplomacy with Nigeria largely focused on placation, due to its greater 
amount of financial capability and political influence within the Commonwealth and 
Africa. Aid programmes were less efficient to the wealthier Nigeria than Zambia and 
Tanzania, and in fact Nigeria would eventually threaten to economically sanction Great 
Britain in the result of the government recognising Muzorewa. Whilst there were some 
common factors, such as Lord Harlech’s140 visit to the Frontline States and Nigeria in 
140  David Ormsby-Gore, 5th Baron Harlech was a Conservative politician and diplomat. 
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order to foster diplomatic ties, the manner in which diplomacy was carried out and the 
incentives offered was tailored to the relative strengths and weaknesses exhibited on a 
per-nation basis.
Direct pressure was key in influencing British policy in the short term;this mostly came 
from the Nigerian, Kenyan, Zambian, Mozambican and Tanzanian governments, with 
the latter three being part of a group known as the Frontline States. The FLS were 
already working independent of the Commonwealth in order to destabilise the situation 
in Rhodesia through the supply of arms, training and men to the PF, and by 
implementing what was effectively a blockade around Rhodesia through 
sanctions.141142143 These actions against the Rhodesian government had been ongoing 
since the early 1970s, but it was after the 1979 election that some of these nations 
began to widely use their Commonwealth status in order to directly pressurise the 
British government into action regarding majority rule in Rhodesia. The fact that Smith 
had conceded (even limited) power to the black majority gave hope that it was a matter 
of when, rather than if, an acceptable settlement could be achieved in Rhodesia. Due to
these concessions it appeared increasingly possible that a constitution and election 
acceptable to the African states would be achievable with the help of the British 
government. In addition to this, the timing of the Lusaka Conference later in the year 
afforded leverage over the newly elected British government, as the event of them 
recognising the Muzorewa government as legitimate would have caused monumental 
backlash at the conference.144 
The importance of Nigeria in particular was made apparent soon after the election in 
Rhodesia. At this time, Nigeria was a nation with a military government that was 
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opposed to Muzorewa and contained significant hard-line elements willing to advocate 
extended violence in Rhodesia in order to achieve majority rule.145 Despite this, there 
was a hope that the Nigerian government would play ‘a helpful role’ at OAU and UN 
meetings.146 The fact that Nigeria was allied to the Frontline States, whilst being a key 
member of the OAU and an important African member of the Commonwealth, had a 
distinct impact. Whilst Nigerian interest in the Rhodesia problem had certainly been 
growing during the course of the Internal Settlement, the elections in Rhodesia and 
Britain being only a week apart meant that the Nigerian government redoubled 
communication with the new British government. The first communication between the 
Prime Minister’s Office and the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs was one 
week after Thatcher officially became Prime Minister. In this early dialogue, pressure 
was already being placed upon the British government but remained civil, with the 
Commissioner emphasising the necessity for cooperation towards a UN sanctioned 
election, but issuing a veiled warning that ‘if Nigeria’s views were disregarded, (the 
government) would no longer be able to render any effective assistance’.147 The British 
response to the concerns of the Nigerian government were cautious but hopeful, 
agreeing that ‘there were serious problems… to be faced and which could lead 
potentially to conflicts of views and interests’, noting from the start the policy of the new 
government to ‘make full use of diplomatic dialogue to minimise those risks’.148 
Despite this relatively positive beginning, the Foreign Office quickly recognised the 
potential danger of lifting sanctions or recognising Muzorewa and the likely 
repercussions of doing so. British sanctions had been applied from the first day of UDI, 
and began with the tobacco and sugar industries, the cessation of aid, the banning of 
arms sales, and the removal of Rhodesia from the Commonwealth.149 This was 
extended in 1966 to a full export ban to Rhodesia, which whilst not fully effective in 
preventing British companies operating in Africa from trading in Rhodesia,150 the 
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eventual result of majority rule being accepted by Smith did ‘come close to achieving 
the goal of sanctions as defined by Britain’.151 Britain was throughout this period the 
‘leading actor in implementation of sanctions’.152 Due to this element of leadership, 
British adherence of sanctions being a key element in their observance globally, with 
this ensuring ‘nominal compliance from even sceptical Western powers’.153 In addition 
to this, the adoption of sanctions had thus far prevented African nations from pressuring
the British government into ‘the use of force or all-out economic warfare’;154 sanctions 
could not be discontinued due to the fear of ‘provok(ing) African and Commonwealth 
reaction’.155 This was acknowledged by Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington who argued 
that even the U.S could not end sanctions, as this would put the British government ‘in 
a very difficult position at Lusaka’.156 These ranged from relatively minor and ceremonial
diplomatic penalties such as the removal of British diplomatic elements from Nigeria for 
a time, to extreme measures such as extensive economic sanctions and the withdrawal
from the Commonwealth,157 with the British government planning to counter these 
actions with similar penalties when possible, noting here the usefulness of Germany as 
a block to Nigerian sanctions due to its financial support in several major Nigerian 
development projects.158 
It is at this point that British government policy can be seen to be formulating, with the 
emphasis on the short term on preventative measures to protect the British economy 
and the Muzorewa government, at least until long-term policy could be discussed at 
Lusaka. Nigeria, as a relatively economically and politically strong African nation, faced 
the brunt of this policy due to it holding the greatest amount of leverage against the 
British government at this point. Whilst not able to seriously damage the British 
economy as a whole, the fact that ‘Nigeria had already taken steps to deprive British 
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firms of contracts ‘159 in the wake of the elections meant that the threat to British 
‘interests in black Africa’ had to be strongly considered as a problem for the future.160 
The non-aligned nature of Nigeria161 likely contributed to this, and led to it being 
discussed along with Zambia as key examples of British interests in Africa that could be
‘lost’, with an implication that this loss could be to Soviet or Chinese influence.162 First 
World Commonwealth nations were unlikely to act hostilely against the British 
government, whilst other African states were generally unable to act individually due to 
economic concerns. Nigeria was as such a key threat to the stability of the situation, as 
evidenced by concerns within the government that regarding the possibility that Nigeria 
lead the OAU against the British government, or attempting to convince other African 
states to join it en masse in leaving the Commonwealth.163 
British government policy at this early point consisted of attempting to stall recognition 
of the Muzorewa government and the abolishment of sanctions, whilst planning for the 
medium term at Lusaka. Unfortunately, this policy was interrupted by the Nigerian 
government as early as 24 May. The establishment of a British representative in 
Salisbury triggered Nigerian concerns that the recognition of the Muzorewa government
was imminent, and as a result the government placed an embargo on the awarding of 
public sector contracts to British firms, beginning by rejecting a British firm bidding on a 
contract worth 130 million Naira.164 This embargo was publicly announced, and was 
stated as; ‘until the British government clarifies its attitude to black Africa, the Nigerian 
government is not prepared to entertain any new proposals from British companies’165 
The loss of not only the 130 million Naira contract, but also a number of other contracts 
were at risk, at least until the embargo was lifted, at which point bids could be 
resubmitted.166 Whilst this embargo was not across all British contracts in Nigeria,167 
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there was a strong fear that this could eventually be the case, and harmed British 
businesses’ confidence in the region. General Electric Company had been asked to bid 
for a large power station project in Lagos state, and was worried about whether it was 
worth ‘undergoing the considerable expense of preparing a bid’.168 The possibility of 
expanded embargoes in Nigeria led to great uncertainty for British businesses, and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office worried that about considerable financial losses in 
the region as a result of this uncertainty.169 As Britain’s largest trading partner in Africa, 
Nigeria held a degree of power over the British government that the FLS could not.170 
The Nigerian government made its motives clear regarding the embargo, through a 
statement from the Nigerian Minister for Works agreeing to remove the embargo only if 
the British government made a statement clarifying that the establishment of a 
representative in Salisbury did not indicate support for Muzorewa.171 
The use of direct action was the first sign of British policy being forced to deviate from 
stalling for time with regards to the recognition of Muzorewa due to the nature of the 
embargo. The Foreign Office stated that due to the official announcement by a 
government figure that the contract would be rejected, ‘the embargo… (was) made in a 
more public way than we feared’. This led to the necessity for the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to formulate policy immediately, as other contracts would be at 
risk. The threat of further embargo led to Mervyn Brown172 recommending that action be
taken immediately due to the possibility of ‘growing public demand for the Nigerian 
government to take further damaging measures’.173 The next day, the government 
agreed to send Lord Harlech to Nigeria during a trip to the Frontline States (which 
Nigeria was not part of), due to the ‘political and economic importance (that) justifies 
the inclusion of Lagos in the itinerary’.174 Whilst this meeting was to be held slightly 
later, in June, at this point the British government was beginning to understand the 
troubles that Nigeria could cause, and this inclusion showed the necessity of keeping a 
clear diplomatic channel between the two nations. Despite this, there was a worry in 
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Nigeria that this meeting may not come soon enough, and this translated to threats 
from Nigerian government representatives on the 29 May regarding the nation’s place 
in the Commonwealth should Muzorewa’s government be recognised.175 Only a day 
later, it was discussed that bringing Harlech’s trip to Nigeria forward by over a week 
would be vital to preventing further damaging punitive action by the Nigerian 
government to British economic interests in the nation.176 
Whilst there were fears as to what Nigeria might demand or what actions they might 
take at the Lusaka meeting,177 by the end of June this policy of constant communication
and reactive diplomacy had borne some fruit. The Nigerian government had not 
progressed any further with sanctions against British firms, and Lord Harlech’s ‘mission’
to Africa had ‘made good progress in convincing (the Nigerian and other African 
governments) that (the British government) was genuinely trying to find a way 
forward.’178 Whilst the Nigerian government had no real reason to extend unnecessarily 
harsh sanctions and in general ‘did not mind who won the elections, provided they were
fair’,179 warnings that recognition of Muzorewa by the British government would 
exacerbate the armed struggle abounded in meetings between representatives of the 
two nations.180 Despite this scepticism, Harlech’s mission had succeeded in helping to 
convince the Nigerian government to ‘make the kind of contribution at the OAU meeting
that Britain was requesting’ if the British government could attempt to make a public 
statement, backed by Muzorewa, stating only that further constitutional talks would be 
needed.181 Whilst time certainly played a factor in the softening of the Nigerian 
government’s position,182 as did visits by Muzorewa to Washington and London,183 the 
continued use of diplomacy that ended with Harlech’s visit was arguably the key factor 
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in defusing this situation, at least until the Lusaka conference. For the first time since 
the election, the British government could believe that it shared ‘a common objective’ 
with the governments visited by Harlech.184 Diplomacy over time with Nigerian 
representatives reached a level that was ‘calm… friendly and good humoured’185, with a
working relationship forming over time that resulted in a much less hard-line and more 
flexible stance from the Nigerian government that simply requested reassurance that 
the British government was not stalling on recognition until after Lusaka, with the two 
parties eventually agreeing in a 21 June meeting that the British government would 
attempt to propose a new constitution as soon as possible, and that a settlement would 
need to involve Muzorewa.186 This resulted in a far more stable situation that before for 
the British government, and meant that their greatest threat to a solution in Rhodesia 
was for the most part nullified until after the Lusaka conference. 
In the event of crisis, Nigeria’s power as a Commonwealth nation was to be supported 
mostly by the Frontline States of Zambia, Angola, Botswana, Tanzania and 
Mozambique. However, these nations were unlikely to act alone or as leading a group 
of nations in any type of drastic manner, as had been threatened by Nigeria. This was 
due to their relative political187 and economic188189 weaknesses when compared to 
Britain, and due to their placement in the midst of the Rhodesia crisis could not afford to
invite more unrest when acting alone. Nigeria knew this and utilised its power to 
‘nationalise British Petroleum’s holdings and from time to time linked its oil policies with 
Western policies on Southern Africa’, something that these weaker nations could not 
afford to do.190 In contrast; Mozambique and Angola were known in 1980 for seeking 
‘more,rather than less, economic relations with the West’,191 with Mozambique in 
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particular aiming for American investment.192 Similarly, Zambia relied heavily on copper 
exports, and faced disruptions limiting the trade of this coming from within the region 
even without clashes with Western powers.193 Nigeria was able to withstand the effects 
of withdrawing from the Commonwealth or placing sanctions, and was politically 
important enough to lead a group of smaller nations against Britain, the Frontline States
were too politically weak, too economically fragile to attempt something similar until the 
Lusaka Conference. As a result, British government policy took a different form with 
these nations and was far less preventative, instead taking the form of reassurances 
and attempting to take a leadership role in the developing situation. As there was less 
short-term threat from these nations acting to disrupt Britain, there was less need to 
constantly monitor the situation and act to placate them, and more of a focus on 
ongoing diplomacy and assurances in order to assure a respectful and neutral climate 
for future discussion on the wider scale.
In mid May, meetings with representatives with Angola and Tanzania showed this wish 
to keep positive relations with these economically weaker states in order to prevent a 
cohesive campaign against the British government or increased support for the PF. The
Angolan government here warned that recognition of Muzorewa would have the 
potential effect of pushing them closer to the OAU or the Soviet Union or support in the 
region, but that Russian relations may not necessarily be Angola’s first choice, stating 
that the nation was pleased with UK/Angola relations, which were ‘progressing 
satisfactorily’.194 Government discourse with Mozambique was generally non-committal 
on both sides, with the British government managing to curtail any extreme 
Mozambican reactions by arguing that the current Mozambique and Angolan regimes 
had been recognised by the British government despite the fact that ‘democratic 
elections had never been held in these countries’.195 This, combined with Mozambique’s
precarious position as sharing a 550km border with Rhodesia that saw a large amount 
of guerilla fighting,196 meant that this policy of relative non-committal in the short run 
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prevented Mozambique from acting in an extreme manner, partly due to fears of ‘major 
escalation of the conflict in Southern Africa’.197 
Most important of the Frontline States were Tanzania and Zambia. These nations had 
comparatively more influence over the situation, and so it was the British government’s 
responsibility to avoid angering them. Zambia was an influential nation during this time 
due to its position as a non-aligned state, and as such diplomacy between its 
government and Britain’s was important to securing long term peace in the region. 
President of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda approached the problem from a positive and 
friendly stance, emphasising in early communication with Thatcher the importance of 
Britain to trade,198 and whilst condemning the current Rhodesian regime as unsuitable 
to lead,199 suggests support by stating that ‘the new British government should seek the
vigorous assistance of those able and willing to help’, and that Kaunda was willing to 
write to show how the British government could act in a way that would guarantee his 
support.200 Kaunda was still committed to ‘hanker after the unattainable’ of a traditional 
decolonisation201, but was viewed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that his 
‘mind was not closed’. On the whole, Kaunda was willing to ‘support any genuine effort’ 
towards majority rule, with the use of the Commonwealth as a collaborative group seen 
as a potential route to take.202 Through continued discussion, the British government 
managed to achieve some progress as Kaunda understood that he needed ‘a free, 
independent, peaceful and viable Zimbabwe’203, and after Harlech’s visit he was ‘not 
closed on the possible ways forward’.204 This meeting in particular helped to make 
Kaunda understand that ‘the Zambian and British governments shared the same goal’ 
as Zambia needed ‘a stable neighbour in the south’,205 and British diplomacy 
immediately after the 1979 election helped to convince Kaunda of the helpfulness, with 
this ever-improving relationship contrasting with Kaunda’s declining relations with some
of the Frontline States, particularly Nyerere.206 This more positive relationship helped 
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set the scene for a positive Lusaka Conference and ensured that this bloc, whilst 
strong, would not rival Nigeria in terms of influence and power. 
Britain’s status as ‘one of Zambia’s biggest trading and development partners’207 and 
the common knowledge that Zambia’s economy was struggling intensely both 
contributed to British influence in reaching a positive solution with Kaunda. This was a 
key issue as it meant that a quick solution was needed in order to save the Zambian 
economy, which had gotten so bad that it had required the reopening of some trade 
links with Rhodesia from late 1978 onwards.208 The closing of these links would have 
led to Zambia further being ‘unable to avail herself of potentially efficient trading links 
across the Zambezi, with this potentially crippling Zambia as ‘the area of soils (in 
Zambia) which (would) grow maize (the staple food) successfully (was) minute’; any 
food shortages could not have been dealt with efficiently had Zambia closed off all links 
with Rhodesia.209 Along with this, the ‘uncertainty of copper prices… (created) an 
insecure foundation for the Zambian economy.210 At this time, copper was ‘over 90 
percent of the export earnings of Zambia’, and so the ‘short-term volatility’ of copper led
to widely varied export earnings and government tax revenue.211 Due to this, and the 
fact that copper contributed to 14 percent of the overall wage employment of the nation 
in the mid-1970s, Zambia could not afford to shun British economic involvement. Had 
the Zambian government done so, the British government could have restricted aid 
programmes or trade. Since Zambia's independence in 1964, the British government 
had given £139.4 million in aid, £33.3 million of which had been in 1978.212 The 
withdrawal of future funds to Zambia would have caused increased economic issues for
the country. These economic problems had also led to a general feeling of 
disenchantment with armed struggle and the presence of ZANU forces in the nation 
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due to the strain that they placed on the economy.213 Whilst Kaunda did still support the 
PF ideologically, the Zambian economy was failing due to its dependency on Rhodesia 
and the impact that sanctions had had on this relationship,214 and this allowed for British
policy to convince him of the government’s intentions by Lusaka.
Facing similar issues, diplomacy with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania proceeded 
in a similar manner as he was said to have given representatives ‘a general instruction 
to avoid the adoption of extreme attitudes’ on Southern Africa, and was initially unwilling
to openly conflict with the British government.215 Nyerere was concerned with economic 
issues in the region that revolved around Uganda due to close links between the 
Ugandan and Tanzanian economies. This meant that Nyerere was unwilling to act 
rashly in case British economic or political assistance was needed should other 
situations in the region damage ‘his relations with other African states and the OAU’.216 
Due to this, continued diplomatic contact bore fruit, with Nyerere making it clear that he 
was largely unwilling and unable to ‘live up to his reputation as a leader of the liberation
struggle’217 , partly due to his fears of the Rhodesian situation ‘leading to an East/West 
situation’ that would have repercussions economically and politically for Tanzania.218 
The British government recognised this willingness, and whilst using continued 
diplomacy and reassurances, the British government’s ‘generous aid programme’219 
helped initially with Tanzania/Britain relations and showed the use of economic 
incentives as a way to prevent immediate action from these smaller nations. British 
policy in Tanzania concentrated on ensuring that ‘the greater the loss involved for 
Tanzania in possible deprivation of our help, the more carefully Nyerere will reflect 
before encouraging or supporting extreme action damaging to (British) interests… in 
Africa’.220 This policy arguably succeeded, and by late July Nyerere agreed to go to 
Lusaka ‘to be helpful’ and that ‘he hoped that there would be immediate progress 
towards achieving acceptable constitutional change’.221 The Foreign and 
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Commonwealth Office felt that, in the wake of this, alongside Harlech’s ‘mission’, there 
was ‘some sign of movement in the thinking of the Front Line presidents’.222 This feeling
was echoed by Thatcher, who believed that Nyerere and Kaunda were in ‘considerable 
difficulties and would probably welcome an agreement on Rhodesia’, showing an 
awareness of the types of interactions that would work best on Nyerere.223 Through the 
policy of constant reassurance of British commitment to finding a new solution and an 
understanding of Tanzania’s needs, by the start of August the government had began to
adopt a more moderate position, a change seen across most of the Frontline States.
Whilst not such a troubling prospective for the British government in the short term, 
policy and diplomacy with British allies such as Australia and the USA was important to 
the formulation of longer term policy, as a concerted effort was needed in order for this 
to be implemented. Whilst these nations did not pose a direct threat to British influence 
in the region or the economy, their cooperation was key for the successful 
implementation of future plans. British policy regarding Australia was as such generally 
positive and cooperative, with both governments wishing for a peaceful solution in the 
long run. The Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser wrote to hatcher on 19 May 
stating that whilst the elections symbolised a step forward for Rhodesia, there was still 
much progress needed in order for the government to be accepted as fully legitimate, 
suggesting further talks including the PF.224 There was really very little for the two 
nations to disagree over during this time, with Thatcher writing in May that she 
welcomed the Prime Minister’s ‘wish to keep in close touch’ and disclosed early British 
policy, including Harlech’s visit to Africa.225 This continued through to June and July as 
the Lusaka Conference approached, with a meeting at the end of June focusing on this 
very issue.226 As the British and Australian governments were broadly in agreement 
over Rhodesia, and understood that whilst the situation had changed due to the 
successes of the election, its legitimacy was still under question.227 This meant that 
policy towards Australia did not need to include any coercion as was the case with 
African nations, but rather focused on preparing for future challenges, such as how to 
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proceed at Lusaka,228 when to renew or remove sanctions on Rhodesia,229 the state of 
current relations with Nigeria and the Frontline States, and how this could be influenced
in the future.230 There was a general friendly, positive and cooperative atmosphere 
between the two governments, and this was reflected in the close diplomatic ties 
shared during this time.
Whilst communication with the United States was similarly positive and did not harbour 
a direct threat to British government influence, it was still not as straightforward as with 
Australia, due to US fears of Socialist influence in the region. Whilst looking to find a 
solution that would include ‘more legitimate and genuine majority rule’, the US 
government also was deeply concerned with Western influence in the region, starting in
early June that any solution ‘should preserve our diplomatic and ties of trade with 
friendly African governments and also limit… the opportunity of outside powers to take 
advantage of the situation… at the expense of the United States’- adding of the latter 
issue that ‘this is very important’.231 As can be seen, the US government focused not 
solely on cooperation for British interests, but also for its own. 
This can be seen best in the US Congress and Senate initially voting to remove 
sanctions against the behest of President Carter232, as many did not understand the 
current problems in Rhodesia and saw the continued imposition of sanctions after an 
election that was successful on the surface as unjust. As a result Carter had to ‘fight 
congress’ due to his belief that if the British government wished to maintain these that it
was necessary to continue them, at least in the short term.233 The removal of these 
sanctions would have been disastrous for Britain, as this would have been widely seen 
as tantamount to recognition of the Muzorewa regime234 due to their status of being 
imposed by a mandatory UN resolution.235 On May 15th, Senate passed a resolution by
seventy-five to nineteen in favour of removing sanctions, ‘and that the installation of the
new multiracial government satisfied U.S. demands for majority rule and therefore 
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sanctions should be lifted’.236 Carter and Thatcher needed each other’s support on this 
issue, as ‘both needed each other’s support to stave off domestic pressure to lift 
sanctions immediately’.237 Similar to Britain, the USA received a warning from Nigeria 
that any removal of sanctions would result in ‘an appropriate response from Lagos’.238 
This, luckily, prevented the Senate and Congress from going over Carter’s head to 
force the issue; ‘the threat of a Nigerian oil embargo grabbed the public’s, and 
congress’s, attention (and) was a splash of cold water that made people ready to listen 
to the argument that it would be rash for the US to lift sanctions before Great Britain’.239 
Despite Carter’s lack of support in Congress and the Senate, the threat of Nigerian 
action convinced the public and government figures that to keep sanctions would be the
best action for the USA at that time.
As this shows, British policy and diplomacy had only a small impact on the almost 
completely autonomous US policy in Southern Africa, but often worked in tandem with 
the desires of Carter, who was determined to achieve a free and fair majority rule. 
Whilst the United States and Britain were generally agreed on what needed to be done 
in Rhodesia, they were not always united on a wider government level on how these 
aims could be achieved. This was in part due to US fears for its own interests and lack 
of understanding of the broader picture. British government diplomacy regarding the 
USA focused on attempting to prevent the removal of sanctions due to the potential 
impact that this would have 240 This focused on maintaining a stance that the British 
government would not do this until at least November when the sanctions would expire 
naturally, as this would allow Britain to attend Lusaka ‘in the position of being able to 
point to continuing consultations with all the parties concerned’.241 The removal of 
sanctions would have shown Britain as willing to ignore the concerns of African 
governments. Luckily, this tactic worked as President Carter announced that ‘the US 
could not unilaterally move ahead of the UK on the Rhodesia issue’.242 
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Initial diplomatic movement by the British government during this time largely focused 
on ensuring that allies remained allies whilst attempting to mitigate the effects of crisis 
on its relations with its critics within Africa. The emerging nature of crises during this 
early post-election period and the new-found scrutiny of British government policy in 
Rhodesia ensured that quick and precise diplomatic actions were absolutely necessary 
to establish the greatest degree of stability possible, as this would be necessary for 
achieving an eventual settlement.
British government policy and diplomacy until the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting
British policy after immediate crisis management was split between plans leading up to 
and including the Lusaka Conference in early August, and plans from then until the 
Lancaster House Conference in early September. The reason for this split in policy was 
due to the fact that, until the Lusaka Conference, there was no confirmed mandate for 
another election or constitution. This  meant that policy mostly focused on whether 
either should happen and if so how to broach the subject on an international level. In 
contrast, in the month leading up to Lancaster House, it was known that there would 
indeed be both a new constitution and election, and as a result policy was focused on 
how to address the situation in ways that would allow for the smooth completion of the 
Constitutional Conference, and how to ensure all parties attended. Due to this, it is 
necessary to split British government policy into that which was formed before the 
agreement at Lusaka on a new constitutional conference, and the policy formed after. 
By July, the British government had accepted the election as being mechanically 
legitimate but as needing improvements due to ‘criticism of the Constitution… and (a 
need for) progress to be made towards ending the war’243. As a result, the British 
government’s policy objective was now openly ‘to try to bring about condition in which 
legal independence can be granted to Rhodesia with wide international acceptance’.244 
This was clearly something to be done at Lusaka with the other Commonwealth heads 
of state, with the possibility of eventually including the Frontline States and the PF if 
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necessary. Due to this, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Prime Minister’s policy 
was mostly focused on continued diplomacy as seen previously, but this time with a 
growing emphasis on planning for the Lusaka conference.
The initial plan was to bring about constitutional talks in Rhodesia that would at least be
acceptable for the majority of international observers. This was formulated in late June, 
primarily between Lord Harlech, Sir Anthony Duff245 and Thatcher.246 At the conference, 
a starting point for bringing Rhodesia to acceptable majority rule would be to propose 
plans that would convince Muzorewa to allow discussion on more than ‘purely cosmetic
changes’ to the constitution which would allow for wider acceptance of the regime.247 
The talks at Lusaka would then be followed by a constitutional conference that would 
either be shunned by the PF (leading to their loss of a great deal of political credibility) 
or would commence to either success of collapse. This would then lead to the new 
constitution and new elections. The long term goal was to implement this constitution 
along the lines of other ‘standard UK sponsored constitutions given to Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda’,248 and would need to be carefully balanced to be acceptable to those 
supportive of the Internal Settlement and those critical of it. The plan was to float these 
ideas at the Lusaka conference, with Harlech suggesting in his June report that the key 
issues to be addressed were; the need to improve the current constitution, to reach a 
settlement that stemmed from Britain as the legally responsible authority, to attempt to 
reconcile the internal and external parties, and to oversee eventual departure of Smith 
from government.249 These would be suggested at Lusaka in an attempt to formulate an
acceptable agreement for the widest range of groups involved.
These policies were first discussed officially and put into a coherent document on 4 July
1979, in which a timetable based on Harlech’s advice and included proposed changes 
to the constitution that would gain the widest internal and external acceptance.250 
November was stated as the point at which this plan needed to be in motion as that 
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was the time for renewal of sanctions in Rhodesia, and any decision without progress 
towards a new constitution would cause anger internationally and could further harm 
British interests in Africa.251 Further, it outlines that a ‘determined policy’ should be 
announced after the Lusaka conference and that these discussions needed to be taken
in mind of the level of support from black African states at the Conference.252 These 
basic plans included: to bring Rhodesia to legal independence as soon as possible, 
with the understanding that the current settlement would not gain international 
recognition;253 that a constitutional conference and election would be necessary to 
achieve this; that it was possible that there would be resistance from within Rhodesia;254
and that it was necessary to ensure friendly relations with African states in order to put 
pressure on the PF should they refuse to attend the conference.255
These plans were to be fully announced at the Conference, but policy was used to 
improve the chances of these being successful during July. In talks with the Nyerere, 
Thatcher accepted the responsibility of Britain to implement these plans, but requested 
African help in doing so. Nyerere agreed that a talk condemning the current constitution
and espousing the virtues of talks for a newly proposed one would help to convince 
African states of the legitimacy of any future elections, and would assist in forcing the 
PF to stop hostilities.256 Similarly, it was agreed in a meeting prior to the conference with
the New Zealand Prime Minister that was necessary to avoid an onslaught against 
Muzorewa, and that too hard a line on the situation should be avoided at all costs.257 
The British government at this point believed that there was a general consensus on 
the Lusaka Conference as being a new start for progress in Rhodesia, and most 
involved in the situation were willing to wait until the Conference commenced before 
acting rashly. British diplomacy had combined with policy planning for the long term to 
create a positive atmosphere for the start of the conference which was to be built upon 
throughout its proceedings.
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British government diplomacy at the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting
At the Lusaka Conference itself, British policy focused on mediating the attendees 
whilst attempting to espouse the virtues of the previous election. Policy focused on 
accepting the failures of the previous election whilst not seeking to dwell on them but 
rather to attempt to move forward with discussions. The end result of the Conference 
was overall incredibly successful, with even relative hard-liners such as the Zambian 
government through a national newspaper praising the ‘frankness and sincerity of 
purpose’ of the British government, and describing past friction as ‘natural between 
close friends’.258 The same article further explains the dangers of Smith as a stumbling 
block to proposals, signifying a change in Frontline State rhetoric to being more 
sympathetic to British interests, with this being a result of the careful diplomacy of 
months gone by.259 Similarly, the New York Times was pleased with developments at 
Lusaka, praising the ‘talent of the British for diplomacy’ and suggesting that even if the 
initiative were to fail, Britain would still be commended for beginning the process.260 
Even relatively hard-line non-Commonwealth Presidents such as Antonio Neto261 of 
Angola accepted the proposals of Lusaka on the basis that they had been accepted by 
all thirty-nine commonwealth leaders. By adopting the idea for a moderate new 
constitution along the lines of previous British decolonisation efforts, whilst including 
African nations in a positive and diplomatic manner, the British government had 
successfully navigated the main issues faced following the election. In doing so it had 
managed to use immediate and short term policy in order to bring the Frontline States, 
Muzorewa and the Commonwealth to some form of common ground for the basis of 
progress in Rhodesia.262
During the Conference, a continuation of previous diplomacy and the moderate nature 
of the British plans was key to the success of the conference as a starting point for 
further progress. Despite the Conference starting off with an ‘unfriendly and 
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unpromising’ atmosphere,263 ‘an early talk with President Nyerere of Tanzania revealed 
that the Front Line Presidents had agreed among themselves to leave the initiative’264 to
the British delegation. This was due to their reliance on the British government with help
for domestic issues, and a general anxiety that the a solution to the Rhodesia problem 
would be key to solving some of these issues. The cabinet felt that ‘because of their 
domestic difficulties Presidents Nyerere, Machel and Khama were all anxious to see a 
settlement’ and that ‘the same was probably also true of President Kaunda of Zambia, 
whose economic problems were even worse’.265 In the eventual Lusaka document 
outlining the plans for a constitutional conference266, ‘all Commonwealth governments 
had accepted the primacy of Britain’s role’.267
This new-found willingness was enhanced by Thatcher’s ‘new and moderate tone’ that 
reassured that recognition of the current Rhodesian government would not occur in the 
light of the new constitutional plans, an anxiety that had plagued the Frontline States 
since April.268 This was followed by a speech in which she emphasised a need to avoid 
being isolated from the Commonwealth, a wish to deal more tactfully with African 
partners in the wake of issues with Nigeria, and a feeling of reassurement due to the 
new-found moderation of the Frontline States.269 In this speech, Thatcher highlighted 
the positive aspects of the ‘consultations (Britain had) been pursuing within the 
Commonwealth and with other African governments’270 and outlined the British 
government’s commitment ‘to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia’.271 Perhaps the 
key element of this speech, however, was Thatcher’s future commitment to diplomacy 
with the Commonwealth over Rhodesia, stating that ‘the value of these days in Lusaka 
will lie not only in the outcome of our discussions around the table… (but) equally… in 
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the friendships which we are able to renew and in the fresh contacts which we are able 
to make during our time together’.272 This renewed commitment to close diplomacy and 
cooperation was to form a key element of future British government policy in Rhodesia, 
and the language and tone of Thatcher’s opening speech at Lusaka clearly displayed 
this on a public level.
This progress was emphasised shortly after the Conference ended, in a television news
interview in which the Prime Minister stated that she expected to work with the Frontline
states, and that there was no longer a reason for conflict with the British government 
now that there was an agreement on what should be done.273 Similarly, a press meeting
on 6 August from Lusaka showed the successes of the talks, and the quick manner in 
which agreements had been reached due to British diplomatic efforts leading up to the 
Conference. At this meeting, the Prime Minister stated that the Conference offered 
‘hope… (as) each and every one of its clauses has the support of our Commonwealth 
partners who are just as anxious to end the hostilities’, mentioning specifically Tanzania
and Zambia as being particularly afflicted by the violence274 and reiterating the fact that 
over time all parties had been able to ‘recognise the urgency of the problem and that 
the chance (to solve it) might not occur again’.275 British policy thus far had been used 
to improve foreign relations with key nations to the point that, when the urgency and 
importance of the chance offered at Lusaka became clear, these nations were at their 
most willing to work together with the British government to find a solution where before
they may have resisted. 
This attempt at foreign relations and diplomacy between the 1979 election and Lusaka 
is shown through the Prime Minister's Office files available at the National Archives. 
These show that Thatcher met or spoke directly with Nyerere five times,276 and Kaunda 
ten times.277 Similarly, meetings between these leaders and diplomats were common, 
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with Zambian278  diplomats meeting with Thatcher twice, and British High 
Commissioners Sir. W. Leonard Allinson279 and Sir Peter J.S Moon280 meeting with 
Kaunda and Nyerere five281 and seven282 times, respectively. with additional meetings 
between diplomats also occurring.283 Key meetings during this time were bilateral 
events, with these being between leaders, during Harlech’s ‘mission’284, and ‘at least 
one’ occurring285 between Allinson and Kaunda. These bilateral meetings were relatively
uncommon due to the fact that often diplomatic discussions were during meetings 
including other ‘distinguished visitors’ to a country.286 Whilst simply meeting does not 
fully prove intent, the constant communication at varying levels of government showed 
a level of commitment from the British government to attempts at diplomacy leading up 
to the Lusaka conference on both a Prime Ministerial and Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office level.
The success of the Lusaka Conference was largely due to this commitment to 
convincing the Frontline and Commonwealth states to work in tandem with the British 
government to find a solution; British policy at the Conference itself was an extension of
this diplomacy. As a result, the future plans for a Constitutional Conference and a new 
election were universally accepted at Lusaka, and for the first time in years the 
Frontline States were seen to be ‘in agreement… that continued bloodshed must 
cease’287 and newly agreed on the necessity of putting pressure on the PF should they 
refuse to attend future British-led Constitutional talks.288 Perhaps the greatest progress 
that policy at the Lusaka Conference established was that Frontline State members no 
longer followed the previous line of the PF as the only acceptable solution that had 
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been set at the OAU Summit ten days before,289 with Kaunda and Nyerere going as far 
to privately admit that they would accept the eventual winner of any fair election under 
the terms set at Lusaka.290 The shift in opinion from the Frontline States showed that 
cooperation between them and the British government could be possible, and that 
continued contact since May had allowed for these nations to see the British 
government as an ally on the issue of Rhodesian majority rule. Whilst immediate crisis 
management was to remain vital, longer term diplomacy targeted at maintaining good 
relations with the government's harshest critics was also critical in achieving a 
settlement containing terms conducive to the holding of legitimate elections in the 
future.
British government planning and diplomacy from Lusaka to Lancaster House
As a result of this combination of diplomacy and longer term policy planning, the 
previously formulated British plans for Rhodesia were announced and agreed upon at 
the Lusaka Conference and contained basic provisions for the country’s decolonisation.
These specified that the cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions were the key 
objectives, and that this would be achieved through a specific process, agreed on by 
the countries at the conference.291 This process was that there would be a 
Constitutional Conference later in the year, at which there would be two delegations of 
equal size, divided between the internal and external parties. These parties would 
receive an outline of what the new Constitution would be beforehand, with the current 
administration being made aware of more complete details of the Constitution in 
advance. This process was utilised in order to ensure fairness for all parties, and to 
allow all groups to examine the new constitution without the pressures associated with 
an internationally-scrutinised conference. In addition, the British government pledged to
allow the Frontline States to remain involved in order to put pressure on the PF to 
attend the conference and to remain open minded about progress in Rhodesia.292 Due 
to the rocky relations exhibited previously between the PF and British government, 
chain diplomacy was key to the achievement of British government objectives in 
Rhodesia and as a result much effort was made to ensure strong relations with the 
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Frontline States remained. This was in order to allow the Frontline States to use their 
influence on the PF where the British government could not, with this being agreed 
upon by Nyerere who stated that he could ‘argue for Britain’s authority and impartiality 
between the parties fighting the election’.293 The presence of the Frontline States as 
allies was to be key in ensuring that the PF remained willing to continue talks over 
Rhodesia, as direct contact between the British government and PF leadership was to 
remain minimal until Lancaster House.
The pre-Lancaster House process also included several additional technical aspects 
that would have to be adhered to in order for the various parties involved to be 
satisfied. Recognition by Commonwealth States that there was a new dimension in 
Rhodesia due to the limited successes of the election, and Commonwealth affirmation 
that it was Britain’s responsibility to lead this effort to bring Rhodesia to majority rule294 
were the key elements of this. This understanding was to be coupled with a relative lack
of partisanship, and an absence of condemnation of Muzorewa or endorsement of the 
PF was requested. From a British perspective, pledges that the constitution would 
contain appropriate safeguards for minorities and that it would be Britain’s responsibility
to oversee the next set of elections were made.295 These agreements, checks and 
balances were made in order to ensure a positive atmosphere leading up to Lancaster 
House, and to prevent division between Britain and her Commonwealth allies until 
December.
The new task was to implement the policy goal of achieving new elections in Rhodesia 
through the formation of a British-designed constitution. Whilst the main points of this 
constitution were to be discussed at Lancaster House and as a result were not the 
focus of policy during this time, it is important to note the key areas of the constitution 
that were to be discussed. The outline of this new constitution was proposed internally 
on 9 August in the wake of the Lusaka conference, and was expanded upon over the 
coming month into a draft constitution to be debated by the invited delegations.296 The 
main areas in which this new constitution differed from older ones were; that white 
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representation in parliament would be reduced,297 that bills would no longer require a 
positive vote of 78 out of 100 members to become law in order to prevent whites from 
blocking laws,298 that whites would nonetheless receive a guaranteed number of seats 
for a period of years after independence,299 and that control over the army and police 
would be given over to commissioners, with these following general policy directives of 
the Prime Minister.300 
By doing so, the police and defence forces would not be completely controlled by the 
government as was previously the case under Smith, but would rather follow a general 
set of guidelines with a degree of autonomy. These changes were sought to ‘render the 
Independence Constitution defensible to international and democratic opinion and more
comparable to those we have agreed… to certain other African countries’ whilst 
ensuring that these changes were still moderate enough so as not to ‘undermine the 
confidence of the white community’.301 These were the main points of the draft 
constitution, and led to its quick completion between the Lusaka and Lancaster House 
conferences- as the constitution was to be discussed, ‘changes in other areas (were) 
less essential’302 and could be added to at the conference, such as ‘making it easier to 
acquire land… for Africans’.303 These key goals were outlined in Cabinet Office records, 
and were the main focus of the newly written constitution.
As this technical side of the draft constitution was quickly completed and was largely 
based upon a combination of previous independence constitutions, the goal of the 
British government for the coming month was to ensure that both the internal and 
external parties were present and willing at the Lancaster House Conference in 
September. As the Commonwealth Frontline States had agreed upon this at Lusaka, 
diplomacy with Muzorewa and the PF came to the fore, as their attendance was 
essential to any future progress in Rhodesia. The cabinet suggested that ‘we must now 
move quickly to take advantage of the agreement reached a Lusaka’, stating further 
that initial contact had been made with Muzorewa and that invitations would be sent to 
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his party and the PF in the following week.304 Whilst Muzorewa was expected to be 
open to these ideas, the issue of the PF failing to attend was one which needed to be 
immediately addressed, with a key policy directive at the beginning of August being to 
ensure that it was difficult for the PF to ‘claim that it is not worth their while attending the
conference at all’.305 This was to be done by minimising the amount of information about
the new constitution that would be sent to parties beforehand, as it was expected to 
‘incorporate the substance of the existing constitution’ which may have been a barrier to
PF attendance.306 British government policy in the longer term relied on this, as once at 
the conference the PF would either have to accept or reject the constitution. The need 
for secrecy until then was due to the fact that should the PF reject this, it was 
necessary for the British government to be able to ‘demonstrate that it is their 
intransigence which is the main obstacle to a wider agreement’- the attendance of the 
PF and the presentation of a reasonable constitution would ensure either this, or the 
acceptance of the terms included.307 By ensuring this, British relations with the ‘African 
presidents and others’308 would hopefully improve to a point at which the PF lacked 
outside sufficient outside support to continue armed insurgency against Muzorewa 
under a new constitution.
The attendance of the Bishop was a relatively simple affair as he had so far failed to 
gain a significant foothold within Rhodesia and faced continued opposition from 
outside. Due to the Commonwealth wide agreement that the Conference was needed, 
and the targeting of reforms at the constitution rather than at Muzorewa himself, the 
British government ensured that there would be little resistance from Salisbury when 
asked to attend.309 Whilst Muzorewa initially criticised the Conference and described the
Lusaka Agreement initially as ‘'an insult to the electorate and the government of this 
country’, upon reassurances from the British government as to the nature of the 
constitutional talks he agreed to attend two days after the conclusion of the conference 
at Lusaka.310 Muzorewa was told that Thatcher was fully willing to continue to work 
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closely with him, that a representative from Britain would visit Salisbury to go through 
the plans, and that it would only be Rhodesian parties allowed at the Conference, with 
12 representatives each.311 This alleviated his fears that the British government was 
abandoning him, and that other African nations would be allowed into the conference, 
with this assurance in particular said to please Muzorewa greatly.312 A later meeting 
confirmed this, whilst showing his worry regarding ‘his serious misgivings about further 
elections’.313 Despite this, Muzorewa agreed to attend on assurances that elections 
themselves would not be decided upon at the conference. This was likely due to his 
wish to avoid another election, and his hope that by attending the conference he might 
be able to ‘pursue his arguments’ for decolonisation whilst avoiding having to 
immediately contest in another election.314 Shortly after, Muzorewa contacted the British
government to confirm his place at the Conference, reiterating his wish to continue a 
friendly relationship with the government that had began to develop, asking only for the 
addition of funds to bring extra members of his administration with him.315 This was 
quickly accepted by the government as it was feared that refusing to do so would be 
taken very badly and could cause problems for the smooth running of the conference.316
Ensuring that Muzorewa attended Lancaster House was key to British government 
policy, as without his participation the PF would have been incredibly unlikely to attend 
either. This would have destroyed hopes for a settlement and may have ensured that 
the Rhodesia situation would be ended only through violence.
In contrast, ensuring PF attendance at the Lancaster House Conference was no easy 
task. The British government knew that attendance by the PF was absolutely vital to a 
settlement in Rhodesia as their absence during the last election had been a key issue 
among the Frontline States. To ensure PF attendance, the British government aimed to 
create independence plans that would be seen as reasonable enough to allow the 
government to claim that ‘refusal… to attend… or to work within the traditional 
framework of an independence constitution would be unreasonable and a proof of bad 
faith’ on the PF’s part.317 This was to be done by releasing only ‘the bare outline of the 
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independence constitution’, as by giving more details to the PF would only offer them 
more points to take issue with.318 By implementing this idea the policy goal was to make
it difficult ‘for them to claim that it is not worth their while to attend’. This was because 
the easiest way to achieve a settlement was either through PF inclusion in the 
constitution, or by being able to ‘demonstrate that it is their intransigence which is the 
main obstacle to a wider agreement’ to a degree that would force the Frontline States to
drop their support of the PF and recognise the Muzorewa government.319 As it was, this 
policy worked as the PF accepted British invitations to the Lancaster House 
Conference but rejected their initial constitutional outline, allowing for either of these 
outcomes to be a possibility.320 British government diplomacy over the past months had 
been key to this, as without the Frontline States’ compliance in British-led proposals for 
a new constitution it would have been impossible to pressurise the PF. 
Due to this, government policy towards the PF was divided between ensuring that the 
Frontline States would make good on their promises to pressure the PF should the 
settlement have gone awry, and convincing the leaders of the PF to attend the 
conference. Whilst the Frontline States were seen as being generally on the side of the 
British government for this round of negotiations, continued diplomacy was necessary 
to ensure that things remained as such. It was suggested that whilst the Tanzanian, 
Mozambican and Kenyan governments ‘wanted out of their commitments to the PF’, 
Kaunda would be the least reliable in putting pressure on the PF if needed.321 As a 
result of this, government diplomacy focused mostly on Kaunda and Zambia, and 
began soon after in a letter from the Prime Minister to Kaunda, in which she described 
her ‘deep appreciation and admiration for (his) Chairmanship of (the conference), and 
how his ‘handling of the discussions (allowed the outcome) to be so constructive’.322 
This letter was ended by stating that Kaunda’s ‘continued support will be essential if we 
are to succeed, and I am sure that I can count on it’.323 Thatcher’s rhetoric here showed
her willingness to continue diplomatic links with Kaunda, and her understanding of him 
as a powerful ally in the region. Kaunda was said to have agreed to cooperate in 
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Rhodesia should a ‘genuine democratic regime be established’,324 but followed this up 
by warning that time was running out for the Rhodesian regime and suggested that this 
would be the last chance for peace, with this appearing as a veiled threat in retaliation 
to previously shunned Zambian efforts.325 Despite this, in his response to Thatcher he 
wished her ‘God’s blessings and guidance in the very difficult task you are undertaking 
on behalf of all of us’, showing the level of respect built up between the two.326 Due to 
Zambia’s strong links to Nkomo, it was difficult for Kaunda to pressurise him to the 
extent required by the British government. This need to convince him was reiterated on 
the 17th, with the idea for a further visit by Lord Harlech being discussed.327 
An early way in which this support was achieved was ensuring that a £10 million aid 
package that was expected by Kaunda was delivered as soon as possible, as ‘to 
withhold signature at this time would cause serious misunderstanding in our relations 
with Zambia’.328 Whilst ensuring no misunderstandings was important, key to securing 
Zambian support were plans made in late August, during which a government 
representative was sent to meet Kaunda with the intention of convincing him.329 The 
arrival of this envoy signalled a great change in British and Zambian relations, and was 
greatly appreciated by Kaunda who said that the meeting was very useful and agreed 
to remain in constant diplomatic contact until the start of the Conference.330 At this 
meeting, British representatives outlined ‘the step by step approach we shall be 
adopting at the Conference’, and assurances that ‘a Commonwealth force or some 
other neutral force’ would not be discounted as a way to ‘police an arrangement’.331 This
meeting convinced Kaunda to work closer with the British government, in which he 
agreed to ‘exert his influence with the Patriotic Front to participate in elections’ and that 
he would accept ‘genuinely impartial elections’ and that if the PF lost these, ‘Zambia 
would no longer support them’.332 This was after these discussions managed to relieve 
some of his fears about the ceasefire and the security at the elections, and close talks 
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with British representatives convinced him of their plans.333 After being reassured of the 
British government’s intention to announce its responsibility for these issues at the start 
of the conference, he agreed that Zambia would use its power at the non-aligned 
conference and in the OAU to prevent any more disagreements over Rhodesian until 
after Lancaster House.334 Through this diplomacy, the key force in the Frontline States 
was convinced of Britain’s ability to lead talks, at least in the short term. This helped put
pressure on Nkomo, who was as such made more likely to enter the Conference with a 
positive mindset.
From a British government perspective, convincing Mugabe and Nkomo directly was 
not an easy task due to lacking a history of diplomatic contact between them and the 
government. Due to this, the task of convincing them to attend was largely done 
through the Frontline States, with minimal British government contact. The main way in 
which Mugabe was convinced was via the ordering of discussion at the conference with
a basis for independence taking precedence, as he had previously shown a preference 
for.335 Aside from this, the fact that the British government was taking control over the 
situation meant a great deal for Mugabe, who insisted that he would only negotiate with
Britain as the constitutional authority, and voiced a wish for his opinions on the matter 
to be heard at the conference.336 The main action that could be taken by the British 
government at this point was to continue to ensure that Mugabe understood that the 
conference would be a platform at which he could discuss his grievances, should he 
attend. As such, British government policy towards ZANU during this time could only 
hope that pressure from the Frontline States and the thorough nature of government 
plans for Rhodesia would be enough to tempt Mugabe to attend. This was ultimately 
successful due to the widening split between Mugabe and the Frontline States, with this
culminating at the Non-Aligned summit in Havana, at which they insisted that the PF 
not only attend Lancaster House, but also that Mugabe should not walk out of it.337
Nkomo was slightly easier to convince, due to his close links with the Frontline States. 
Once they were agreed to be involved, he stated that he trusted them and would take 
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part in the talks, although at this early point he remained sceptical as to their likelihood 
of success.338 In a meeting at the end of August between Nkomo and a newspaper 
which was later forwarded to the Prime Minister, Nkomo was said to be confident in 
attending talks as he expected to win any future election,339 and whilst suspicious of the
British government he was said to be respectful of the Prime Minister, and weary of 
fighting the ongoing war.340 Previously mentioned British government policy with Zambia
during this time largely determined the success with Nkomo, who saw this as an 
opportunity to end the war and to potentially use the Conference to split with Mugabe in
favour of an alignment with Sithole.341 
By convincing the attendees of Lancaster House that were most critical of the British 
government, the success of the conference itself were increased. Ensuring that the 
most powerful and influential figures at the conference were at least receptive to British 
ideas and needs was to be useful in ensuring a balanced and moderate settlement. 
Gaining influence and trust with the Frontline States over the course of months was 
vital in ensuring that crises could not immediately cause collapse and bought the British
government time and flexibility when these situations did occur.
The Lancaster House Conference
Policy at the Lancaster House Conference itself focused on ensuring that all parties 
remained around the negotiating table, and that the eventual constitutional changes 
were acceptable to all parties, including international observers. Gregory argues that 
government policy revolved around using the progress made at Lusaka to achieve 
Rhodesian independence with Britain at the helm, and that this was achieved largely 
due to government diligence in ensuring international support for every step of the 
conference.342 This was the main policy for the British government to implement at the 
Conference, as Britain was attending as a mediator and all changes to the constitution 
were directly debated between the Rhodesian parties. Talks progressed relatively 
smoothly for the first month. Despite this, there were points at which an impasse was 
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reached, and the British government had to implement policy and use diplomacy in 
tandem in order to ensure the continuation of talks. This following example from 
October shows the fragility of the British position at this point, and the limits to the 
effectiveness of policy during this period due to the turbulent nature of the PF and the 
lack of time that this afforded the government to form and implement policy.
This key crisis in October regarded agricultural and land policy in Rhodesia after 
independence and occurred around a month into discussions. Whilst both African 
delegations had began to agree on the British draft constitution and on issues such as 
preventing whites from being able to block parliament and the number of white seats in 
parliament, there were still areas of contention for the PF.343 This first issue was that the
PF held a preference for ‘confiscation of commercial farms without compensation’344, 
whilst the British draft constitution followed a largely continued form of the ‘existing 
white-dominated system for land ownership’.345 The draft constitution included 
protections for white farmers from the ‘expropriation of land without compensation’,346 
whilst making ‘fully adequate provision for the government to acquire land for 
settlement’.347 The PF was concerned that excessive protections would be given to 
white farmers in terms of land ownership, and that government reclamation of land 
would be impossible due to a lack of funds for this purpose. Due to the potential cost of 
funding this, the British government was unwilling to ‘establish a specific amount to 
financially support the purchase of land from white farmers’,348 and could only offer 
‘initial capital’ and ‘support (to) the efforts of the government of independent Zimbabwe 
to obtain international assistance’.349 
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Due to these concerns, the PF initially refused to accept the draft constitution and 
attempted to keep open the possibility of reverting their stance at a later date. This was 
seen to be unacceptable and on the 11th October the British government requested 
that the PF decide one way or the other before talks could proceed, suggesting that 
failure to do so would represent ‘that our discussions over nearly five weeks had been 
inconclusive’ and would throw the future of the Conference into doubt.350 This impasse 
caused Carrington to warn the PF that discussions going forward would proceed 
without them if they failed to accept the draft constitution in the near future.351 The 
possibility of this occurrence raised a host of problems for the British government as it 
was feared that this would lead to the ‘remaining stages (being) much more difficult’ 
and could expose some allies (particularly within Africa) as being ‘fair weather ones 
only’.352 This worry was confirmed as Kaunda began to petition the British government 
to change land rights to include a fund for compensation for white landowners affected 
by land redistribution, and whilst less severe than PF plans did show the potential 
difficulties facing the British government over this issue.353 
The government response to this was to highlight the struggles faced in securing the 
Salisbury delegation’s acceptance of the constitution, and the effect that further 
changes may have on this,354 whilst accepting that it would be necessary to provide 
some financial assistance for agricultural development, but only if other nations could 
assist Britain in providing funds.355 Carrington announced this on the 11th of October, 
warning that discussions could not continue until the PF accepted this along with the 
new constitution.356 Talks reached a stalemate for around a week, during which time the
British and PF camps worked with their allies to reach an agreement. The PF worked 
with the Frontline States, who attempted to convince them to find a solution, and 
assisted in introducing a solution by which the PF could accept the constitution whilst 
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registering their unhappiness about certain aspects.357 This was necessary as the 
British government were beginning to tire of having to move deadlines for agreements, 
and were worried that further delay could cause Muzorewa to simply leave the 
conference.358 For this reason the British government moved to bilateral talks with 
Muzorewa until the PF could accept the constitution, with the threat of this being that if 
the Frontline States were to side with Britain, the PF would find itself excluded from 
talks with no allies.359
On the 13th, a Foreign Office representative spoke with Kaunda to clarify this proposal, 
with Kaunda initially stating ‘flatly that he supported the PF position over land’ 
requisition.360 Kaunda and Mark Chona 361 outlined their position on Rhodesia, with 
Chona taking a harder line and stating that ‘the British had taken land by force. The PF 
had now liberated areas, including areas from which farmers had fled. Why should they
pay compensation to departed owners?’.362 This showed the potential for Kaunda to 
cause problems for the government in negotiations, but he did say that for the 
meantime he would ‘tell (Mrs Thatcher) privately what he thought… but would not touch
on them in public as that would rock the boat’.363 This came as a result of Allinson 
arguing in favour of allowing whites to retain some land rights in Rhodesia as this would
be ‘very important for smooth transfer and creating confidence’.364 Kaunda ended this 
meeting by reiterating that ‘if (Britain) agreed to go on as the PF wished we would fine 
them more accommodating’, but also that there was ‘now an exceptional chance to 
solve the Rhodesian problem and it would be a great pity if we failed through great 
rigidity’.365 This suggested a level of understanding from Kaunda that both sides at 
Lancaster House would need to be more flexible in order to reach a satisfying solution. 
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The same day, Carrington sent a letter to Nyerere promising that ‘we would help… with 
technical assistance for land settlement schemes and capital aid… we shall also be 
ready to help the new government obtain international assistance for these’.366 This 
letter concluded with Carrington asking that Nyerere use his ‘support and influence to 
bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion’ by gaining the ‘Patriotic Front’s 
acceptance.’367 This was in the wake of a previous discussion on the 10th, during which
Nyerere had urged the British government to consider more flexibility on the issue and 
had preceded the suspension of the conference.368 During this meeting, he also 
sympathised with the British stance on land and stated that he realised ‘no constitution 
without such provisions would get through the British parliament’, but that the British 
government ‘must however understand how important this issue was to the PF’ and 
should ‘try to help them’.369 On the 14th, another discussion occurred, at which the 
government presented their basic proposals. Nyerere reacted well to this, and stated 
that he ‘welcomed the fact that it had come down to the land question and 
compensation, because he thought this was solvable’.370 Eventually, Nyerere agreed to 
persuade the PF based on the preliminary suggestions made by the British government
on the 11th should a definite statement be made on the agricultural fund.371 Nkomo had 
put a figure of £55m for dealing with the land question; Nyerere ‘considered this was 
very reasonable (and)... wanted to suggest (the British government) should take Nkomo
up on his figure’.372
Despite the successes of these talks, they would not have progressed so smoothly 
without US intervention and assistance. On the 14th, in the wake of these preliminary 
discussions with Kaunda and Nyerere, the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance agreed 
to privately contact the Frontline States in order to agree on a US-backed multi donor 
effort to assist agricultural compensation and development in Zimbabwe, contingent on 
the success of the constitutional conference.373 The US spoke directly to the PF as well 
as the Frontline States, and this direct contact combined with the promises of a fund 
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greatly helped to quicken negotiations on the issue.374 This US involvement almost fully 
alleviated Nyerere’s apprehensions on the issue, with him suggesting on the 16th that 
the issue could be fully resolved with his help if the government were to make clear to 
the PF the British government position on the land issue, with the confirmed backing of 
the US, further accepting that it was ‘not yet necessary to put a definite figure on the 
sum’.375 Similarly, US involvement caused Kaunda to become more flexible on the 
issue. The meeting between him and the British government on 13 January was 
followed by another on 15 January . During this meeting Kaunda agreed to use his 
influence at a meeting with the Frontline States in order to put pressure on the PF, but 
only if he could agree with British proposals for land reform and if the British 
government could ‘be more specific over land and make a definite statement, 
preferably forming part of the agreement’.376 He also said at the meeting that ‘the US 
statement was more helpful’377, and that ‘land was the sticking point… (and asked for) a
definite and specific undertaking which he could use to lever the PF to agree a 
constitution’378 and reiterated his wish for the British government ‘to help him on this 
one point so that he in turn can help (in return)’.379 Richard Luce380 visited Kaunda on 25
October, at which he presented ‘assurances by the British government and that of the 
United States on the vital question of land, common ground was found’.381 These 
assurances resulted in Kaunda agreeing to work in tandem with Nyerere at the 
Frontline States meeting later that week and ‘enabled the Patriotic front to continue with
the talks’.382
These eventually restarted on 18 October, and the crisis was averted. The constitution 
was agreed and the next issues to be discussed involved its implementation and the 
conduct of the forthcoming elections. British diplomatic policy had worked quickly here, 
and over the course of less than a week had been able to solve the first major crisis at 
the Conference. However, this episode does show the delicate balance at the 
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Conference, and the fragility of the British position regarding Rhodesia in general. Had 
talks collapsed at this point, there was no promise that Nyerere and Kaunda would 
have supported the British position over the PF due to the nature of the disagreements,
and this shows the limits of diplomacy for the British government. They needed to be 
increasingly careful as Britain's involvement would transition from advisory and distant 
to that of a colonial power overseeing the transition to majority rule of one of its 
colonies on both an international and local level.
Chapter 2: From the Lancaster House Agreement to the 1980 election
The British government’s efforts throughout 1979 had largely been effective in moving 
Rhodesia away from a white minority dominated government towards a process of free 
and fair elections under an internationally acceptable constitution. The ability of the 
British government to effectively utilise diplomacy as a tool for allowing the 
implementation of longer term policy had been shown at the Lusaka Conference and 
during Lancaster House, at which major stalling points in discussions had to be 
navigated with care. Whilst the Lancaster House Conference signalled a turning point in
the history of Rhodesia and had allowed both the PF and Rhodesian government to 
meet at the same table, the British government’s job was far from complete. Long-term 
policy goals still had to be met, and this was to be achieved through careful planning 
and the use of constant diplomacy with parties and actors within and outside Rhodesia.
Lancaster House symbolised the best level of cooperation between the governments of
Britain, Rhodesia, the Frontline States, African members of the Commonwealth, and 
the Patriotic Front. Young described Lancaster House as being ‘a triumph for the major 
parties involved’383, whilst Dunn highlighted Thatcher’s admission that ‘the Lancaster 
House proposals could not have got through without the support of the presidents of 
the Front Line States’,384 suggesting that close cooperation between Britain and these 
nations was of great importance as ‘these tactics underlined the importance of the 
commonwealth ‘family’ connection’385 that had been built up over the past year. Dunn 
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further argued that the British government’s use of these nations as diplomatic partners
was ‘a cogent example of how timing, and the build-up of domestic pressures upon 
interested parties could significantly influence the processes and resolution of 
international summits’.386  The arguable success of the Lancaster House Conference 
allowed for the British government to continue diplomacy with those involved in a 
manner similar to prior to the Conference, with the goal being shifted from that of a 
successful agreement in December 1979 to a successful and legitimate election in 
Spring 1980. For this reason, and to  show the evolution and progress of British 
government policy implementation and diplomatic contact, the events are most 
effectively explored chronologically and through a British government perspective. This 
allows for a close view of how and why the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Prime Minister formulated and implemented diplomatic strategies and policy in the 
months leading up to the 1980 election. 
Following the Lancaster House Conference, the Lancaster House Agreement (LHA) 
was settled between the parties attending that laid out the foundations for a new 
Constitution in Rhodesia, and the route that would be taken to achieve independence 
through elections in the country. This agreement was made on the 21 December 1979 
and would be used throughout the coming months to plan British government 
involvement and policy towards Rhodesia. The main two sections of the LHA were the 
new Constitution and proposals for pre-independence arrangements. The Constitution 
has been discussed in the previous chapter and included solutions to issues of white 
dominance in government and the exclusion of the PF, whilst the pre-independence 
arrangements outlined British involvement in Rhodesia until the elections. This 
involvement included Rhodesia remaining ‘part of Her Majesty’s dominions’387 until 
power could be transferred to ‘whatever leaders are chosen by the people of Rhodesia 
in elections… supervised under British authority’.388 These arrangements also stated 
that ‘a direct British involvement’389 was necessary to create conditions conducive to 
successful elections, and gave the Governor powers ‘to make laws by Ordinance for 
386  Dunn, D.H. ed., Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The evolution of international summitry. 
New York: Springer. 2016. 214.
387  Lancaster House Agreement, page 34. From http://sas-
space.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979_Lancaster_House_Agreement.pdf
388  Lancaster House Agreement, page 35.
389  Lancaster House Agreement, page 35. 
74
the peace, order and good governance of the country’, further giving this role 
‘legislative… (and) executive authority’390. The governor was to ‘proceed to Rhodesia as
soon as possible’ and would ‘assume responsibility for the government of Rhodesia 
(with) all political leaders (committing) themselves to the election campaign.391 
This was important as it gave the British government a mandate to remain strongly 
involved in Rhodesia until achieving independence which was internationally 
recognised, something that had been impossible under Smith and without the 
participation of both internal and ‘external’ (such as the PF) Rhodesian political groups. 
By agreeing on ‘the principle of British authority’392 in Rhodesia, the British government 
had received an internationally-backed allowance for their involvement in overseeing 
the Rhodesian elections. The placement of Lord Soames as governor of Rhodesia for 
‘a nine week transitional period’393 allowed the British government to have an agent 
allied directly to them and holding a place of great power in Rhodesia for the first time 
since 1965’s UDI. Carrington was key to achieving this degree of control over the 
destiny of Rhodesia through careful mediation at Lancaster House, with Novak arguing 
that Carrington helped ‘the two negotiating sides close the gap between them and 
come to an acceptable agreement’ by committing ‘Britain to providing substantial 
assistance to the transitional regime’.394 Whilst there were risks to the British 
government committing to the future of Rhodesia, it did allow policy makers to better 
target ongoing diplomacy and policy implementation from a position of authority in 
Rhodesia. 
The other important area that was identified in the pre-independence arrangements 
was the running of the elections themselves. This short term policy was largely formed 
as a reaction to the criticisms of the previous election such as widespread intimidation, 
voter manipulation, and the ongoing effects of the war in Rhodesia. By doing so, it was 
hoped that using the new British presence in Rhodesia would ensure that these policies
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were implemented effectively. The LHA stipulated a number of conditions that needed 
to be fulfilled in order for the elections to be legitimate, such as free political activity, 
freedom of movement and assembly, free access to media for parties and security 
being used only to protect political activity.395 The LHA also included two provisions to 
ensure the highest level of recognition internationally that was possible, with these 
provisions being that Commonwealth Governments would observe the elections, and 
that all political parties would be allowed to campaign and register for the elections.396 
These were important points as exclusion of parties was a key issue that many both in 
Rhodesia and internationally found with the previous elections, whilst the use of an 
internationally organised observer group entirely independent of the British government
and that included a number of African opinions would allow for recognition of the 
election’s successes  and failings to be a less controversial prospect when compared to
the reports published in 1979. 
In general, the appointment of a governor was used as a way to ensure that the 
election and the period leading up to it to be seen as fair and free, as it was no longer a
white minority government controlling areas such as security, policing and transport.397 
This allowed for the provision of these services during the election to be less 
controversial in comparison to the 1979 election as it placed these responsibilities 
under an appointed colonial Governor instead of Ian Smith’s rogue government. The 
pre-independence arrangements were a continuation of British government policy up 
until this point being aimed at correcting the failings of the 1979 election, and to build 
upon the diplomacy of the last year. In order to achieve this it was agreed to be 
necessary to allow the British government to have a greater degree of control over 
Rhodesian independence than before. This was in order to avoid the criticisms of the 
Internal Settlement, such as the exclusion of the PF and continuation of 
disproportionate political power for whites, from being repeated in 1980. These pre-
independence arrangements were presented to the attendees at the Lancaster House 
Conference after the new Constitution had been agreed upon, with the UN Security 
Council calling upon the British government as the ‘administering power… to bring to 
395  Lancaster House Agreement, page 37. 
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an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia’398, further agreeing that the ‘United 
Kingdom… should ensure that no settlement is reached without taking into account the 
views of the people of Southern Rhodesia… and that it is acceptable to the people… as
a whole’.399 
This public statement enforcing compliance under the Lancaster House Agreement was
useful in showing the British government’s commitment to overseeing elections, and 
willingness to utilise the authority of Lord Soames in order to ensure that the election 
would proceed without significant issues that could cause the result to be questioned 
internationally. Whilst the British government would need to continue reactionary 
diplomacy and policy depending on the shifting nature of the situation in Rhodesia and 
Southern Africa as a whole, the government had achieved a new focus. From the 21 
December 1979 and the establishment of Lord Soames as Governor of Rhodesia, the 
main policy goal would be to implement the LHA on the back of progress made during 
1979, and to ultimately oversee a successful election that would bring Rhodesia to 
legitimate majority rule. After signing the LHA, it was agreed in a cabinet meeting that 
‘the main scene of action would now shift from London to Salisbury’400 , and that the 
British government needed to ensure ‘the strict compliance with these agreements’ by 
using Soames as an ‘impartial’ force in Rhodesia to combat ‘behaviour… inconsistent 
with the agreements’.401 Long term planning needed to be combined with short-term 
contingency measures in order to implement the results of the progress made at 
Lancaster House. This was to be achieved through continued conversation with 
important political actors and a commitment to responding to emerging crises quickly 
and effectively.
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As stated by the Carrington soon after the conclusion of the Lancaster House 
Conference, the British government had ‘no wish to prolong (its) role’, and that it would 
be necessary for ‘all parties (to)... act in accordance with these commitments’.402 A long 
or messy route to majority rule would have at this point been directly attributed to 
Britain as the colonial administration and would have drawn further criticism from 
organisations such as the OAU and the UN. Some of the next targets of government 
policy were also alluded to: to utilise Lord Soames’403 role as Governor404 in order to 
enforce the LHA,405 to begin a ceasefire by 28 December406, to assemble rebel forces at
agreed points for disengagement, and to use these conditions to oversee a successful 
election.407 Government policy in Britain focused over the coming month on assisting 
Lord Soames in achieving these goals, and on overcoming the issues faced in 
Rhodesia related the the return of the PF to the country in the weeks following 
ceasefire. Convincing ZANLA and ZIPRA soldiers to return to the country, and then 
enforcing the ceasefire without tensions between PF and Rhodesian soldiers flaring up 
into widespread violence was a difficult prospect.
Onslow has described the role of Soames as ‘the man on the spot’408 who was placed 
to ‘make a marked contribution to the process and tone of political transition through a 
combination of political realism, individual quirks, and personal charm’, highlighting the 
use of Soames as ‘a vital adjunct to big decisions made in Whitehall on the basis of 
geopolitical imperatives’.409 Soames was given a remit in Rhodesia based upon long-
term British government plans and the processes outlined in the Lancaster House 
Agreement, and used his status as someone who did not attend the Lancaster House 
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The British government’s preparations for the 1980 Rhodesian election
talks in order to avoid being ‘seen to be partial’.410 His goal was to use these tools to 
bring Rhodesia to a suitable independence through the long-term planning of the 
government. Whilst the overall long-term goals of the Prime Minister, cabinet and 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office were to remain the same throughout this post-
Lancaster House period, the focus leading up to the election was flexibility in the face of
mounting logistical and political challenges in the region. In January, Soames faced the 
task of facilitating the return of Robert Mugabe and other high ranking ZANU officials to 
Rhodesia. This was a vital policy, as without their public return and reintegration into 
political society, ZANLA guerillas had little motivation to proceed to assembly points and
lay down their weapons in anticipation of the election. Due largely to the security 
situation in Rhodesia, this was not as straightforward as simply allowing Mugabe to fly 
into Salisbury whenever he wished. In a discussion with Mugabe, Achilles 
Papadopoulos411 stated that Mugabe’s return had to be conducted in a ‘sensible and 
mutually satisfactory manner’412 and that his return could not clash with ‘political 
manifestations’ by other candidates.413 Political concerns were equally as important as 
safety concerns regarding the return of Mugabe and the difficult situation in the nation 
was highlighted shortly after his return by an assassination attempt on Mugabe in early 
February.414
Issues surrounding Mugabe’s return began around Christmas day in 1979. The British 
government was made aware by sources within Salisbury that Mugabe’s intention when
returning to Rhodesia was to cross the Mozambique border and to ‘march on 
Salisbury’, gathering support as he did so.415 Soames could not allow this to happen as 
‘it would be regarded as highly provocative… and would certainly lead to… trouble’416 
and would be impossible for the security forces to safely oversee. In this discussion, the
Foreign Office told Mugabe and Nkomo that they ‘would be expected to arrive in 
Salisbury by air’ as large crowds were expected and that ‘the police would not interfere 
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except insofar as necessary to keep the peace’.417 Following this, Mugabe did agree to 
return via air, but announced on 2 January that he would be doing so on the 5th of the 
month.418 Three days was seen by Papadopoulos as too little notice as it left only ‘11 
hours notice’419 for Soames to organise security and conflicted with political rallies 
planned by Muzorewa for that weekend.420 Nkomo was willing to concede on this timing
as he too had planned to arrive in Rhodesia on 5 January. He therefore willingly 
changed his date of return to 13 January,421 but Mugabe took greater issue with this, 
questioning if ‘Muzorewa… holding his rallies’ was a valid excuse for the delay.422 This 
forced Carrington to release a statement answering whether ‘the Governor/the British 
government (were) biased towards Bishop Muzorewa’, arguing that Soames had been 
‘flexible’ and had ‘gone out of his way to help the Patriotic Front’.423
Beitbridge
Altercations between Mugabe and the British government began with this delayed 
return to Rhodesia, and eventually grew into a fully-fledged crisis as he extended his 
grievances to include the positioning of South African troops on the Rhodesian border 
and the use of violence by auxiliary forces provided partially by Bishop Muzorewa to the
Governor in Rhodesia.424 Mugabe criticised the continued position of South African 
troops at Beitbridge, a southern border town with a bridge spanning from Rhodesia to 
South Africa. Mugabe argued that these troops should have been withdrawn as soon as
Soames had arrived and that, in addition, the deployment of Rhodesian army forces 
and auxiliaries for ‘law and order purposes’ was a direct violation of the Lancaster 
House Agreement.425 On the other side of this disagreement was General Peter Walls, 
head of the Rhodesian armed forces and a vital asset in maintaining order in the 
country for Lord Soames. Walls felt that removing protection on Beitbridge would be a 
tactical mistake, and that South African troops should be allowed to reside in Rhodesia 
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as long as they did not intervene in the political process. Lord Soames recognised this, 
and suggested that a complete withdrawal from Beitbridge would ‘seriously imperil… 
relations with Walls’.426 This division on Beitbridge between Walls and Mugabe had the 
potential to spark disaster, as both men controlled large numbers of  men and arms, 
with Walls himself noting the ‘very great pressure from within his own forces and from 
the white community generally’.427 
This disagreement was difficult to resolve, as the Lancaster House Agreement stated 
that the British government would ‘request the governments of countries bordering on 
Rhodesia to make arrangements to ensure that externally based forces do not enter 
Rhodesia’.428 Despite this, Carrington stated that ‘the Governor’s decision to allow a 
small South African force to protect Beitbridge does not represent intervention’ and that 
the protection of Beitbridge was necessary ‘in the light of continuing breaches of cease-
fire in the area’.429 Whilst Mugabe did have valid concerns regarding the legitimacy of 
the placement of these forces, the British government had genuine concerns regarding 
the removal of these troops, and the potential to ‘imperil… relations with Walls’.430 Walls
was the link between the British government and Rhodesia’s armed forces and the loss 
of Walls’ loyalty had the potential to rapidly cause a crisis situation with intensified 
violence becoming a real possibility from both the PF and Rhodesian forces. The British
government needed to utilise Soames’ crisis management abilities in order to ensure 
that the ceasefire in the nation could be fully implemented in time for the election.
The problem of South African troops being used at Beitbridge was, to Mugabe, proof 
that the LHA was not being upheld by the British government. This was evidenced by 
the fact that observations by members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
showed that ‘a significant proportion of (ZANLA) forces’ were instructed to remain 
outside the ceasefire.431 Policy was rapidly focused on placating Mugabe, and an 
internal government response was formulated by Carrington that addressed these 
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issues.432 This response stated that external intervention would not be allowed in 
Rhodesia, but that the South African forces would be allowed to remain due to tactical 
reasons, and that the use of foreign soldiers was not a phenomenon unique to the 
Rhodesian forces in this conflict.433 This was announced on the same day via Lord 
Soames, and it appeared that government policy was content at this point to stall 
Mugabe with these promises of non-engagement by South African forces in Rhodesia 
until he re-entered Rhodesia.434 This was emphasised in an internal statement from 
Soames on the same day in which he stated that Mugabe should be reminded of 
ZANLA’s non-compliance of the LHA in response to his criticisms,435 a sentiment 
supported by a Rhodesia Department notice stating that it was necessary to bring 
Mugabe and Nkomo to Rhodesia as soon as possible to discuss these issues.436 
The British government’s hope was that bringing Mugabe to Rhodesia would force his 
hand, regardless of the placement of South Africans at Beitbridge. Unfortunately, this 
was impossible for two main reasons. First, Mugabe quickly reiterated his opposition in 
a public statement used as propaganda to pressurise the British government by 
bringing international scrutiny upon their policy. He stated that if further breaches of the 
LHA would prevent him from using his influence over ZANLA forces to implement his 
side of the ceasefire, and that the use of auxiliaries also signified a misuse of the 
powers vested in Lord Soames.437 This public statement brought the Frontline States 
into the debate, and despite government reassurance of the successes under Soames 
so far,438 a meeting of these states on the 11 January resulted in a condemnation of the 
use of South African forces at Beitbridge, along with an endorsement of the ZANU and 
ZAPU’s ability to ‘scrupulously observe the letter and the spirit of the agreements’.439 At 
this meeting, the Frontline States agreed to call upon the UN Security Council in order 
to force the British government to remove these troops.440 In a memo the following day, 
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the undesirability of UN involvement was emphasised, with it stating that it would be a 
disaster should ‘(Britain) be drawn into a series of wrangles in the Security Council 
during the transitional period in Rhodesia’.441 By taking these issues to the UN, the 
Frontline States could place pressure on the British government to remove the South 
African troops from Beitbridge. Whilst the extent of the eventual Resolution was to 
‘keep the situation in Southern Rhodesia under control’,442 the powers available to the 
UN included the ability to implement ‘complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations… and the severance of diplomatic relations’.443 The introduction of such 
measures would have been disastrous to British government relations with the Frontline
States and could have led to these states supporting ZANU and ZAPU in further armed 
struggle against the Rhodesian authorities.
It was at this point that the issue diverged, and policy focused on satisfying Mugabe 
and the Frontline States as well as General Walls. By removing South African troops 
and curtailing the auxiliaries, Walls was liable to become displeased with the British 
government and potentially lead the Rhodesian military establishment in ‘deliberately 
causing bloody incidents which would lead to the PF beginning to leave the assembly 
areas’.444 Government relations with Walls were said at this point by D.M. Day445 to 
have been ‘balanced on a knife-edge (with)... serious risk of putting the Governor’s 
position in Rhodesia in jeopardy’.446 On the 10 January, a letter from the Frontline 
States to the British government openly stated their grievances, citing concerns that 
there may have even been South African troops in Rhodesia other than those at 
Beitbridge,447 and the use of auxiliaries in Rhodesia448 that culminated in an incident in 
which Smith/Muzorewa forces deployed by the governor killed a group of PF soldiers.449
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Soames reported in his role as governor to Thatcher stating his fears that Walls ‘greatly
exaggerates the security situation’ and that he would resist removal of South African 
forces from Rhodesia for this very reason, along with concerns that this removal would 
prevent South African support in an emergency.450 Soames also worried in this letter 
that ‘Walls and some of his colleagues are getting into a frame of mind in which they 
would prefer a resumption of war and… a return to UDI to… a government under PF 
influence.’451 To prevent this, he suggested discussions with the South Africans to 
convince them to mix their troops into Rhodesian units to ameliorate PF concerns whilst
preventing Walls from becoming disillusioned as was a feared result in the case of total 
withdrawal.452 
The next day, an Foreign and Commonwealth Office telegram suggested sending Walls
to South Africa to discuss the situation, and that this should be done after attempting to 
convince both Walls and the South Africans that ‘it is in their own immediate and long 
term interests… (for) the future security and stability of Southern Africa.’ Sending Walls 
was used to prevent him from feeling that the government were ‘going behind (his) 
back’.453 That same day, Thatcher had a conversation with the Lord Privy Seal454 on the 
issue, in which she suggested that withdrawing troops from the Rhodesian side of the 
bridge was necessary, but that the South African side of the bridge was unrelated to the
Lancaster House Agreement.455 This was because these troops were South African and
on South African soil, meaning that any agreements binding in Rhodesia or relating to 
Rhodesian forces were inapplicable. In order to achieve these goals, the Rhodesia 
Department suggested that assurances must be made to Walls regarding the 
prevention of PF insurgency, whilst simultaneously negotiating the withdrawal of all 
South African forces in the Rhodesia.456 This would alleviate both Walls’ and Mugabe’s 
complaints as the South African forces would be allowed to remain protecting 
Beitbridge whilst not being seen as an international force interfering in Rhodesia. From 
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this point, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office began working to reassure all parties 
that the problems regarding troops at Beitbridge would be solved. Mugabe was told that
the South Africans would not act unprovoked and that most were integrated into the 
Rhodesian army,457 and that auxiliaries were only being used as peacekeepers in 
response to ZANLA violence.458 Nyerere was similarly reassured of this the same day,459
and also reminded that the Rhodesian forces should be allowed to incorporate foreign 
soldiers as ZANLA and ZIPRA continued to do.460 Diplomacy was used here in order to 
buy time in which Walls could be convinced that changes needed to be made with the 
South African troops. This was because his cooperation was necessary for maintaining 
control over the Rhodesian forces, as public insubordination by Walls may have led to 
the Rhodesian Army as a whole doing the same.
On 19 January, Robin Renwick461 of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office met with 
General Walls, who stated his concerns. Walls spoke honestly and candidly about his 
concerns that the PF was being given too many concessions, and that he feared 
pressure put on him from within his own forces and from the white community as a 
whole.462 Walls felt that Mugabe was able to use violence without proper recourse, and 
it was for that reason that he was unable to back down on issues regarding security at 
Beitbridge, as it would set a precedent for his control being weakened. Both men 
agreed with concerns over ZANU and ZAPU, and agreed that this intimidation was a 
major concern.463 Renwick recognised Walls’ attempts to moderate the actions of the 
auxiliaries464 and agreed that their use was acceptable to the British, but would only be 
possible without international backlash if concessions were made to the Frontline 
States regarding Beitbridge and South African troops. Renwick clarified that the 
government had taken a large amount of international criticism for the troops at 
Beitbridge and that this problem had to be addressed as soon as possible to avoid 
further action - the Kenyans, for example, had threatened to withdraw from the 
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monitoring force.465 Following ‘a long argument’ between the two men, with Walls 
arguing that he had been promised that South African forces could stay in Rhodesia at 
Lancaster House, he finally conceded that Renwick’s demands needed to be met.466 
Soames acknowledged that the government had demanded a lot of Walls considering 
his ‘distraught frame of mind’, and that pushing him further would be a poor idea if the 
government expected continued cooperation from him.467 For this reason promises 
were made that ZANLA infractions against the LHA would not go unpunished.468 In this 
situation, immediate crisis management by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was 
used in tandem with Soames’ position on the ground in order to ascertain the situation 
in Rhodesia and the feelings of its major actors. 
From this point onwards, the crisis was solved without a great deal of further British 
government intervention. Walls was sent to South Africa to discuss the future of their 
troops in the nation soon after his meeting with Renwick,469 and by 25 January this 
common goal470  between the two men allowed for the British and South African 
governments to agree on a full withdrawal of troops on the Rhodesian side of 
Beitbridge.471 On the 31st, the UN Security Council criticised the conduct of the British 
government in Rhodesia, but accepted the removal of the troops,472 and soon after 
Nyerere wrote accepting the outcome.473 Despite these criticisms, the British 
government had somewhat succeeded in resolving the worst of this crisis in time for 
preparations leading up to the election in February. The ‘somewhat grisly performance’ 
regarding Frontline States and ZANU criticism had been weathered, and the British 
government had successfully avoided these groups being able to ‘build a case for 
rejection of the electoral result (should it not) suit the OAU’.474 The key government 
policy of overseeing a legitimate election was still attainable, despite the damage done 
to British reputation due to this crisis. The tentative acceptance of most African nations, 
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along with the continued support of the Commonwealth ensured that Beitbridge did not 
signal the collapse of the Lancaster House Agreement.475 
The use of careful diplomacy during moments of crisis whilst working towards an 
overall goal allowed the British government to act reactively during the impasse at 
Beitbridge, knowing that maintaining control of the situation was vital to the fulfilment of 
the long-term plans set out at Lancaster House. Whilst the events at Beitbridge did not 
conclude with complete success and showed the weaknesses of the British 
government's position, the ability to use influence with key actors on both sides in 
Nyerere and Walls showed dexterity and competency in the government's crisis 
management strategy. The events at Beitbridge held the potential to cause complete 
collapse of the LHA and a return to full-scale warfare due to Walls' position in the army. 
The ability of the British government to negotiate these events and placate multiple 
parties, each with differing demands and motivations, showed the successes of both its
short term and long term implementation of diplomacy.
Upholding the ceasefire
Despite the resolution of the crisis at Beitbridge and the uneasy alliance forged with 
Walls by the British government during this time, upholding the ceasefire mandated at 
Lancaster House was difficult. Preventing violence, intimidation and coercion was key 
to British government policy during this time, particularly due to the increased number 
of political actors present in Rhodesia following legitimisation of ZANU and ZAPU. The 
careful upholding of the ceasefire between the PF forces, the Rhodesian Army and the 
auxiliaries was paramount to the success of the election, as any widespread or highly 
visible violence would allow losing parties cause for complaint which could have de-
legitimised the election. 
As a result, the imposition of the ceasefire was a necessary and rather urgent policy 
goal for the British government in late January and February as the election date 
loomed. Due to the problems regarding Beitbridge and the late entry of Mugabe into 
Rhodesia following his criticisms of the crisis, the ceasefire was unable to be 
implemented with full efficiency until this point as Nkomo and Mugabe only returned to 
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Rhodesia on 13 and 27 January, respectively. This meant that whilst a number of 
guerillas had made their way to the assembly points by the January 7 deadline, there 
were some who were still reluctant to give up arms before the return of their leaders to 
Rhodesia. With the re-entry of the leadership of ZANU and ZAPU into Rhodesia, British
government policy directives needed to focus on making sure that the majority of 
remaining guerilla forces made their way to the assembly points, that political leaders 
were safe, and that the Rhodesian forces were not using unnecessary violence. By this 
point, the greatest threat to a lasting settlement in Rhodesia was the international 
reaction to an election fraught with the problems of intimidation and coercion as had 
been the case in 1979. As a result, the goal of the British government had to be to use 
reactive policy and diplomacy in order to prevent ZANLA intimidation by use of the 
Rhodesian forces without inviting international criticism due to their conduct. It was 
necessary, in light of the events of 1979, for the British government to become involved 
in the ultimate outcome of the election as little as possible, as any drastic action would 
have been viewed as favouritism by Mugabe's allies within Africa. Soames was forced 
to utilise 'political and psychological pressure' to attempt to 'cut Mugabe down to size', 
rather than being able to explicitly act against Mugabe and ZANU through a single 
effective action.476 
On the side of Nkomo and ZIPRA the ceasefire was said to be ‘holding well’ and that 
Nkomo was ‘pursuing a moderate and cooperative line’.477 The return of Mugabe had 
helped with the security situation and the goals of the British government were to be 
focused on maintaining this improved situation until the election so that a free and fair 
vote could be conducted. Whilst PF guerillas were beginning to return to Rhodesia and 
make their way to assembly points,478 this was only the first step of the ceasefire. 
Upholding the ceasefire to create the ‘atmosphere of confidence’ described in the 
Lancaster House Agreement and preparations to allow the future ‘of all forces’ under a 
new government was still necessary.479 Carrington stated in a discussion with South 
African representatives that Soames had successfully ‘been very firm with ZANU’ and 
when ‘allowing the security forces to deal with incidents’.480 This showed the direction of
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British government policy as being focused on allowing these forces under General 
Walls to act in a within reason to maintain the conditions of widespread ceasefire. 
Whilst Nkomo and the security forces were relatively orderly and compliant at this point,
Mugabe and ZANLA were not. Thatcher stated that ‘the activities of the former military 
wing of ZANU caused particular concern to the other parties’481 and that ‘areas 
dominated by Mr. Mugabe’s supporters and by members of his forces who have not yet
assembled’ made campaigning difficult for other groups.482 The widespread nature of 
these breaches was shown through meetings of the Ceasefire Commission, where ‘the 
commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces (were) 
represented and (met) under the chairmanship of the Governor's Military Adviser’ in 
order to ‘provide a forum’483 for both sides to ensure compliance to the ceasefire. In a 
meeting of 12 February, out of a total thirty breaches twenty-one were either by ZANLA 
or in a former area of ZANLA operation, with a further four being attributed to bandits 
armed with PF weapons.484 These breaches, when combined with the overwhelming 
amount of support they continued to receive from other Southern African nations, posed
a problem for Soames and the British government. This problem had to be approached 
carefully on both a domestic and international level. Soames was tasked with using his 
powers as governor to prevent further ZANLA breaches, whilst the British government’s
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Prime Minister used international diplomacy to 
ensure that any actions against Mugabe did not anger his allies in the region. In 
Rhodesia, Soames balanced threats and action against ZANU with the consideration 
that any dramatic recourse against the party would surely lead to the collapse of the 
Lancaster House Agreement. In late January Soames wrote to Thatcher stating that he 
was ‘satisfied by Nkomo’s attitude and compliance with the cease-fire agreement by 
ZIPRA485 but that he needed to ‘consider what action, short of banning a party, could be
most effectively taken to deal with… the persistence and incidents of intimidation by 
ZANLA’.486 Soames outlined the concern that banning ZANU outright would be 
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impossible and would ‘fly in the face of the Frontline States’, but that some action 
needed to be taken in order to deal with ZANLA transgressions.487 
This plan signalled the beginning of Lord Soames being fully utilised by the British 
government as a conduit through which policy in Rhodesia would be implemented, with 
Soames reporting to members of the Foreign Office and Thatcher. The connection 
between longer term calculated foreign policy and Soames’ position as the ‘man on the 
ground’ was to allow for agile and flexible reactions to emerging crises in the region. 
This policy developed by Soames included punishments which could be meted out to 
offending parties, and was combined with publicising examples of ZANLA breaches as 
a way of convincing the Rhodesian public and international observers that action 
needed to be taken. This was necessary as a response to the growing concerns of 
ZAPU, Muzorewa and the white community regarding the use of violence by ZANLA.488 
Soames decided that in the face of this, it would be necessary for the credibility of his 
administration to be able to ‘demonstrate that (he was) prepared to take action to deal 
with systematic intimidation’.489 Soames outlined that the police would be instructed to 
take stronger action to deal with intimidation, and that he would also request an 
extension of his powers as governor.490 These new powers allowed Soames to ‘be able 
to impose limited penalties on a party that systematically breaches the Lancaster 
House Agreement about peaceful campaigning and so on’.491 
Soames continued on by suggesting that it may be necessary to act on this ordinance, 
giving the example of prohibiting ZANU meetings in areas in which they had refused to 
permit other political groups from holding meetings, and that this action could work to 
unite the other parties against Mugabe. Soames stated that this ordinance would also 
allow him to ‘prohibit… speakers guilty of inciting violence’, ‘in the last resort (to) 
disqualify from the elections a party guilty of systematic breaches of the ceasefire’.492 
Whilst releasing this ordinance, he also reiterated that the auxiliaries were to remain 
deployed as a ‘home guard’ in affected rural areas, and that their role was solely for the
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protection of local people and any auxiliaries acting otherwise would be dealt with 
‘severely’. The aim of publicly releasing the details of this ordinance was so that the 
administration could openly act on ZANU breaches, whilst working to alienate the party 
amongst other political groups and the general public through raising awareness of 
their transgressions. This policy was defended by Thatcher against P.W. Botha493, who 
wished for immediate and harsh action against Mugabe. Thatcher stated that the 
publication of this ordinance would ‘in itself exert greater pressure on all parties, and 
particularly ZANU’ and that the governor would have full control over when and how to 
use these powers.494 Lord Soames was working with autonomy within Rhodesia, but 
was working closely with the British government, and his regular correspondence with 
the Prime Minister and Foreign Office shows that policy in Rhodesia was being formed 
with government supervision. This was the point where long-term policy planning and 
short term reactionary actions were being combined in full, with Soames’ localised and 
immediate authority used as an extension of the British government’s broader but more
distant and abstract authority as Rhodesia’s colonial power.
These new powers were widely supported by the other parties, with Muzorewa quickly 
suggesting that the prohibition of ZANU was the only way to ensure a free and fair 
election, and that the banning of the party for its actions was supported under the 
Lancaster House agreement.495 Clearly, there was a precedent for the removal of 
ZANU, but doing so would not be simple due to the amount of support for ZANU both 
within Rhodesia and internationally. Alongside the use of these powers, Soames 
attempted to convince Mugabe that ZANLA intimidation needed to be stopped by him. 
In order to do so, Soames used threats and the release of details regarding ZANU 
breaches in order to harm ZANU standing. Evidence was gathered by Soames’ 
administration of ZANLA transgressions, including that they were acting ‘under 
deliberate instructions from commanders (and presumably their political leaders) to 
withhold a significant proportion of personnel from the assembly process in order to 
teach people how to vote’.496 Soames proposed releasing this information to the public 
with a statement indicating the areas most affected and the impact of this on the 
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legitimacy of the election,497 hoping that this would 'put considerable pressure on... 
ZANU, to reduce the level of ZANLA activity and intimidation... in the two weeks 
remaining before the election'.498 Soames understood the volatility of the situation and 
hoped that the success of this ordinance would prevent him from having to ban certain 
districts from voting, or expel ZANU. This was hoped to encourage the other parties 
whilst deterring ZANLA.499 Through these ordinances, Soames wanted to rapidly put 
measurable pressure on Mugabe without having to resort to such drastic actions as a 
blanket ban of the party. Despite this hope, Mugabe felt that he could continue fighting 
if banned and was not dissuaded from allowing ZANU to continue acting as before. In a
speech at Fort Victoria, Mugabe promised that he 'would not be intimidated by anyone, 
including Lord Soames, (ZANU would) not just stand by and let him back his own 
horse... and create obstructions for us'.500 Mugabe felt that ZANU was the clear 
'favourite' and that the auxiliaries were far more guilty than ZANLA and ZIPRA in terms 
of violence and intimidation. He finished this speech by promising to return to war 'if 
forced'.501
In light of Mugabe's statement promising to resist these new powers, Soames and the 
British government also attempted to use this evidence as a way to open diplomatic 
channels and improve relations with the other parties in Rhodesia. The hope was that 
uniting the majority in Zimbabwe against ZANLA would force its leaders to take a 
stance against intimidation where direct punitive measures had failed. In private, 
Nkomo ‘argued that… it (would) not be possible to hold elections’ after being ‘prevented
by Mugabe’s supporters from holding a meeting at Umali’.502 Similarly, the UANC were 
‘having difficulties’ and felt that ‘they (had) no real chance… if action (was) not taken to 
deal with intimidation by ZANLA’, according to Soames.503 The release of figures 
showing the use of intimidation by ZANLA was also a way to convince the public that 
not all ZANLA violence was a reaction to attacks by the auxiliaries, as had previously 
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been believed.504 These figures were released along with affidavits given in the 
presence of witnesses questioned by the police which confirmed that ZANLA 
commanders were ordering some troops to avoid the assembly places and to continue 
to intimidate the population.505 The release of these figures and the new powers 
invested in Soames was successful in part in uniting the parties against ZANU. Nkomo 
agreed that he would work with Soames and the internal parties, that he would support 
any action by Soames, and that he saw 'the problems facing the country in much the 
same way (the British government and Soames) did'.506 This was highly significant, as 
Nkomo’s previous allegiance to the PF as a whole was being eroded by the actions of 
Mugabe and ZANLA. The ability of Soames to win some support from Nkomo showed 
the effectiveness of short-term British crisis management and of reactive policy as a 
way of dealing with continued ZANLA transgressions.
Similarly, Muzorewa would continue to comply with the Lancaster House Agreement 
and the cease-fire as his party was militarily neutered due to the LHA taking control of 
the security forces away from him. This was a point of great contention for Muzorewa, 
as he felt that Soames was constraining the security forces too much and preventing 
them from fully preventing ZANLA intimidation.507 He and Nkomo both felt that forcing 
Mugabe to reaffirm the LHA which ZANU had been violating was an ineffective way of 
dealing with the problem,508 as Mugabe had previously told ZANLA members to ignore 
any public statements that he made, and to continue their activities against the local 
population regardless.509 Both Muzorewa and Nkomo demanded that Soames ban 
ZANU, but were told that this would only serve to restart armed conflict backed by 
Mozambique and Tanzania.510 At that time, Soames could not afford a full ban of ZANU,
whilst Nkomo and Muzorewa were unable to use violence to sabotage the legitimacy of 
the election. For this reason, attempting to convince ZANU to stop or curtail intimidation
was a less risky tactic to the overall legitimacy of the election than an outright ban. 
Symbolic actions such the the renewal of pledges made at Lancaster House by all 
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internal parties and 'limited penalties' were unable to prevent ZANLA intimidation, but 
posed less of a risk to the survival of long-term plans made by the British government 
at Lusaka and Lancaster House.511 An election tainted by issues of violence was more 
likely to garner sympathetic reactions internationally than a total collapse of the 
settlement as appeared likely in the event of a complete ban on ZANU.
The British government and international diplomacy leading up to the 1980 
Rhodesian election
Whilst Soames was acting within Rhodesia to attempt to prevent ZANLA intimidation, 
Thatcher and members of the Foreign Office attempted to convince Frontline State 
leaders that the resumption of war was unnecessary. The goal of the British 
government was still to hold free and fair elections, and the intervention of Tanzania 
and Mozambique was preventing this as they refused to accept claims of widespread 
ZANU intimidation. In particular, Carrington felt that Nyerere was determined to wreck 
the Lancaster House Agreement, and that 'by free and fair elections, Nyerere meant a 
victory for ZANU'.512 Evidence of this was the fact that Tanzania and Mozambique had 
colluded to send 'large numbers of ZANLA cadres to Mozambique after the cease-fire 
had come into effect' through Tanzania Airways.513 A chief concern was the power that 
Tanzania and Mozambique held in the UN Security Council and the fact that Tanzania 
in particular had been ‘in the forefront in sponsoring unbalanced and highly critical 
resolutions at both the UN and OAU.514 A Security Council Resolution that was strongly 
influenced by these nations had the ability to place great pressure on the British 
government, with this being acknowledged by Thatcher at the end of January. She 
explained that there was 'an attempt by some African countries to take the issue... to 
the Security Council... (risking) serious damage to what has been achieved, particularly
if the outcome (was) a wildly unbalanced resolution'.515 A decision by the Security 
Council to sanction or internationally condemn the British government’s actions in 
Rhodesia would have been disastrous, as it would have dissuaded further action to 
prevent intimidation. Thatcher asked Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark that the 
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Canadian government act as support at the UN, and that whilst discussion at the 
Security Council was inevitable, the assistance of Britain's allies was useful in 'trying to 
keep the temperature down'.516 Similarly, Thatcher appealed to the Liberian president, 
William R. Tolbert Jr., to allow for the 'machinery provided for in the Lancaster House 
Agreements' to resolve any problems in the ceasefire and elections.517
On 30 January the Security Council convened, with British, American, Chinese and 
Soviet representatives voting as permanent members, and East German and Zambian 
representatives voting as Non-permanent members. Also in attendance but unable to 
vote were Tanzanian, Liberian, Mozambican and Botswanan representatives. The 
British government, unlikely to achieve the five votes needed for a veto, required 
careful diplomacy in order to convince allies at the meeting that a mildly worded 
Resolution was needed, and that Tanzania had to be prevented from taking the issue 
further to the Assembly.518 This would have at the least further harmed British 
government control over the situation in Rhodesia as their authority was challenged at 
the highest level of international politics. Additionally, the larger nature of the assembly 
had the potential for Britain to be outnumbered by African states sympathetic to the 
liberation movement in Rhodesia with comparatively fewer allies to offer support. 
Convincing non-partisan Africans that it was not worth following Nyerere's line on 
Rhodesia was vital to avoiding the Assembly, with this being particularly necessary after
the first day of the meeting as the representatives from the USSR, Liberia and Tanzania
opened with 'virulence and offensiveness'519. Parsons, of the Rhodesia Department, 
noted the moderate tone of the Zambian representative,520 and the potential for 
convincing the African attendees aside from Liberia and Tanzania.521 These 
developments made it clear that the British representatives would need to bring some 
African nations around to the idea of a moderate resolution that would be unanimously 
passed, as this would 'avoid the assembly' and the escalation of the situation.522 Such 
an escalation would have been disastrous in the short term, as the British government 
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would need to control incredibly public and delicate situations both within Rhodesia and
on the international stage.
Parsons made this clear on the 31 January, explaining that whilst a Resolution directly 
criticising the British government or rewriting the Lancaster House Agreement would be
unacceptable, a moderate Resolution would be best for all parties. Parsons reminded 
this group that a harsh resolution showing favour towards ZANLA would anger South 
Africa, whilst a resolution harshly against ZANLA would anger Mugabe; these parties, 
Parsons argued, 'had it within their power to wreck the whole agreement'.523 Parsons 
argued that these reactions could not be ignored, and that a moderate Resolution 
would also allow for it to be passed quickly and without a British veto. This discussion 
with less partisan African representatives was successful, and a gentleman's 
agreement was set that he British government would cooperate with the UN Secretary 
General in maintaining a flow of information about the implementation of Lancaster 
House.524 In light of these discussions, Tanzania emerged as the 'main advocate of 
going the whole hog (to the Assembly)' and that the general mood by the evening of 31 
January was 'in favour of securing a British abstention' and showed that 'the Africans 
(had) come a fair way in the direction of our amendments'.525 A British veto of the 
revised text would have been viewed as disrespectful in light of these accommodations,
and would have led to at least Tanzania and Algeria, supported by the Russians, taking 
the issue to the Assembly.526 The inclusion of Russia in this situation would have been a
deeply worrying development, as it would have added a clear Cold-War aspect to the 
crisis in Rhodesia that had thus far remained largely implicit through ideology and the 
general climate in Southern Africa. Preventing African nations from 'continuing the 
battle with (the British government) over Rhodesia'527 was seen as a worthwhile goal to 
sacrifice some concessions in the Resolution, and that allowing the FLS to be 
'constantly kept informed by the administering power (Britain)' would prevent them from
being 'inclined to badger (the British government) publicly in the UN'.528 
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This meeting was largely a success for the British government, but did not conclude 
without presenting new challenges. Whilst the revised text was certainly less harsh and 
removed direct critiques of the British government, the moderate nature of the text 
made it impossible to solicit allied support of a veto or further refusals to vote. The final 
version of the Resolution was written to not supersede the LHA in any way, and 
included some changes in language in order to accommodate this. The phrase 'ensure 
all Zimbabwe nationals freely participate in the forthcoming electoral process'529 was 
changed to 'ensure eligible...'.530 This allowed the British government scope for banning 
individuals from the electoral process, if not a whole party. Likewise, a section on the 
confinement of the security forces and auxiliaries to their bases in conformity with the 
Lancaster House Agreement531 was changed to be preceded with a statement that 'the 
strict compliance by all forces with the terms of the Agreement' was required.532 This 
prevented these forces from being confined to their bases but ensured that they were 
not viewed as immune from reproach.
The meaning of the aforementioned changes was to prevent direct blame of the British 
government and Soames' administration533 whilst ensuring that the terms and 
machinery of the LHA were not overruled or bypassed.534 This was because non-
compliance of any new terms set by the Resolution would have given critics of the 
British administration reason to condemn the election results.535 The only significant 
downside to the moderate voice of the Resolution was that it was impossible for the 
British diplomats to secure allied non-participation in the vote. Contrary to expectations,
the American and French representatives felt that 'the Africans, after coming so far... to 
meet us, would take it extremely amiss if their resolution received favourable votes from
only non-aligned and communist members of the Council and was cold-shouldered by 
the West'.536 Initially Thatcher and Carrington had contacted US President Jimmy Carter
and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, respectively, during the earlier stages of the 
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meeting when a more severe draft Resolution was posed. In these messages, along 
with one sent to President of France Valery Giscard, the threat put forward by Nyerere 
and his ‘uncertain… commitment to the settlement’ was emphasised.537 Alongside this, 
the possibility of the Soviet Union 'encouraging the more extreme Africans' to pass a 
highly critical Resolution that would 'seriously undermine the Governor's authority in 
Rhodesia' was noted.538 In the letter to Carter, Thatcher asked that the US and France 
vote against or veto the original draft Resolution, and that a 'solid' showing of support 
would be necessary to prevent the African attendees taking a failed Resolution to the 
UN General Assembly.539 
The US and French responses were non-committal, with the French agreeing to 
support Britain if the US did, and the US refusing to vote against a Resolution in which 
'the Africans had met (Britain) on every point'.540 As the final Resolution met British 
requirements, the USA and France ended up voting in favour which was a slight 
contradiction of usual diplomatic protocol between these allies and showed the British 
government to be somewhat isolated in the UN. Despite this, the USA, France, Norway 
and Portugal made 'helpful statements' after the passing of the Resolution.541 Whilst the
British government had failed to convince US and French representatives to veto or 
vote against the bill, they had succeeded in whittling down less partisan African 
representatives to a point where the passing of the Resolution was not a long-term 
danger to the integrity of the Lancaster House Agreement. By allowing concessions, the
British government was able to follow the spirit of the LHA whilst remaining open to 
future crises or changes in the situation in Rhodesia. The allowance for Soames to ban 
individuals from being involved in the election and to keep security forces outside their 
bases presented a greater opportunity for flexibility in the face of future developments.
The goal of the British government during the Security Council meeting was to 
'minimise the risk of further recourse by the Africans to the UN as the elections (drew) 
closer', particularly in light of a planned meeting of the OAU in the following week.542 
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This Resolution was seen as a chance to allow African nations to air their grievances 
about Beitbridge and claimed electoral intimidation by the security forces in an 
environment that the British diplomatic services could control, to a degree.543 Allowing 
these grievances to continue unaired until the OAU conference would have prevented 
the British government from defending their actions in Rhodesia. The passing of this 
amended resolution was seen as a fair sacrifice to prevent an OAU meeting where the 
'pure malevolence' of some of the more extreme Africans could have been displayed 
unchecked by a British presence.544 This too, was a concern for the US attendees, who 
felt that maintaining a positive atmosphere at the OAU meeting in February by allowing 
the more moderate Resolution was a significant result, and that a 'poisoned 
atmosphere' would lead to 'more trouble at the UN from Africans'.545 Allowing some 
concessions, and establishing a clear line of communication, was seen as necessary in
order to 'clear up misunderstanding and misconceptions' about the cease-fire and pre-
election period.546 Moon, of the Foreign Office, suggested that Tanzanian extremism 
may have been 'encouraged by what they (saw) as a degree of sympathy on the part of
the Americans and (other British allies)'.547 This was confirmed by Nyerere himself in a 
later meeting with Moon and demonstrated a level of disparity between the British 
government’s position and that of its allies..548 Nonetheless, a moderate but unanimous 
Resolution was less damaging to British relations with the internal parties, unaligned 
Africans and the South African government in comparison with a harsher but contested 
Resolution. 
The use of diplomacy and compromise at the meeting showed that the British 
government needed support, not condemnation, in the prelude to the OAU meeting in 
February. The split between Nyerere and these moderates was useful in allowing the 
British government to remain critical of ZANU without risking an outpouring of criticism 
from within Africa. The OAU meeting, held in mid-February, was  vital to ensuring that 
the general feeling within Africa was not so anti-British that the settlement was in 
danger of collapsing, either before the election or in the case of a Mugabe loss at the 
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polls. Nyerere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique were the main actors working 
against the British government to achieve this. The British government considered that 
convincing Machel to condemn Mugabe's tactics was ‘maybe unattainable’,549 and that 
he was more than likely to support Mugabe in the case of the collapse of the settlement
and resumption of war.550 In advance of the OAU summit in early-mid February, the 
British government approached African leaders, diplomats and members of the OAU in 
order to convince them that it was necessary to resist Nyerere in his attempts to 
sabotage the settlement. 
Convincing these was important as Nyerere in particular had 'taken his position and 
(was) not going to admit to being shifted from it'.551 Nyerere continued to refuse that 
unmonitored and unchecked ZANLA intimidation existed as more than just a response 
to similar conduct by the ‘closely monitored’ Auxiliaries.552 This meant that allies within 
the OAU needed to be sought quickly and a policy to '(urge) moderate African 
governments to resist pressures from radical members of the OAU for further action at 
the United Nations'.553 President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast met with Daly554, 
from the Foreign Office, early in February and was convinced to speak on behalf of the 
British government at the OAU meeting.555 He agreed to speak at the conference in 
order to express the need for no further intervention in Rhodesia by outside powers, 
and to reiterate the need for Britain, as the administering power, to be supported from 
within Africa.556 Simeon Ake, Foreign Minister of the Ivory Coast, also agreed to provide 
statistics detailing ZANLA transgressions in Rhodesia, in the hope that the reiteration of
these from African voices would serve to convince those at the OAU who were still 
sceptical.557 
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Similarly, diplomatic relations between the British government and Kenneth Kaunda 
were resumed after a break of several months due to Zambian anger over Rhodesian 
raids on roads and bridges.558 Assistant to the Foreign Secretary Roderic Lyne wrote in 
early February that a 'message to Kaunda (should) be dispatched very soon, in the 
hope that it might have some effect on Zambia's role at the OAU meeting'.559 These ties
were resumed when Thatcher asked Kaunda ensure that he 'use (his) influence... to 
ensure that no encouragement (was) given to those who practise intimidation and 
violence to believe that they will receive the support of responsible African 
governments'.560 She also urged Kaunda to 'avoid further confrontation at the UN and 
OAU', and that the election could not be fought 'in New York or Addis Ababa', promising
to stay in touch over the following weeks as a 'determined stand... against the real 
dangers to the goal of free elections... by the governments whose interests (were) at 
stake.'561 Alongside this, in-depth details of intimidation in Rhodesia and the scope of 
Soames' powers to combat it562 were presented to Kaunda. Nkomo was also contacted 
and asked to assist the British government in convincing African leaders to behave 
reasonably at the OAU. It was suggested to Nkomo that he 'work on'563 Kaunda and 
other Frontline leaders as his criticisms of Mugabe were often unable to be aired 
publicly.564 This was to be used alongside official Foreign Office channels in providing 
African governments with 'a better understanding... of the problems Mugabe's 
behaviour (caused)'.565 Nkomo spoke to Zambia and Nigeria first and foremost, also 
telling all observers that visited him in Rhodesia of Mugabe's actions in the hope that 
this would make more members of the OAU aware of the situation.566
This combination of diplomacy through both official and unofficial channels showed the 
ability of Thatcher and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to respond to anticipated 
problems through diplomacy. In response to these attempts at diplomacy, Kaunda 
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spoke for the first time on foreign policy in a month.567 Whilst his statements still rode 
the line between critical and supportive of Soames and the British government, The 
Times of Zambia wrote that 'violence and intimidation (were) beginning to raise their 
ugly heads even between the former two wings of the PF', showing that at least 
Nkomo's efforts had reached Zambian ears.568 This led to subsequent meetings with 
Zambian representatives seeming 'less critical' of the British position as reports from 
Nkomo and the Zambian mission in Salisbury came to 'independently support (the 
British government's) briefing'.569 Whilst Kaunda was to remain the non-aligned figure of
African liberation in the region, he stated his willingness to 'support any realistic 
measures to achieve the desired goal',570 and that Zambia would 'accept the outcome of
a free and fair election regardless of who (won)' as long as the British government 
could ensure that the Rhodesian authorities and South Africa did so as well.571 The 
utilisation of direct contact with Kaunda as head of state and through Nkomo as a 
Zambian ally helped to ensure that Kaunda remained impartial. As an African leader of 
influence in the OAU, the support of Kaunda was useful to the British government as it 
represented a member of the Frontline States not wholly critical to its conduct.
Kaunda’s ability to remain impartial when compared to Nyerere and Machel was key to 
the sustenance of a settlement. The normalisation of relations with Zambia provided an 
important, non-aligned and respected mediator within both the Frontline States and the 
OAU. Whilst the OAU meeting still produced a 'wildly one-sided resolution',572 the British
government avoided calls by the OAU to return to the UN. The split between Nkomo 
and Mugabe led to the OAU no longer being 'by and large unite(d)' on the topic of 
Rhodesia, meaning that the meeting saw the 'mischief makers' of Tanzania and 
Mozambique resisted by the likes of Zambia, Nigeria and 'moderate Francophones'.573 
At the summit itself, the presence of moderates allowed British delegates to hold 
'lengthy sessions' with the senior delegates of a range of African nations.574 Whilst the 
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adopted Resolution was ultimately incredibly critical of the British government575 and in 
favour of the PF,576 the lack of official calls to return to the UN to further pursue the 
issue was a great success of British diplomatic policy regardless of how 'one sided and 
damaging' the Resolution was.577 The British delegates did warn moderates at the OAU 
that putting all the blame on the British government and Soames was damaging, but 
this was still preferable to a Resolution calling for further action.578 Renewed diplomacy 
with the non-aligned and moderate factions of African politics allowed for the British 
government to escape direct action by the UN and OAU, at a time where such would 
have greatly harmed the chance for a satisfactory settlement. Short term flexibility and 
constant communication with current and potential allies was incredibly important to 
this, as it allowed for the British government to respond to challenging situations as and
when needed. 
The 1980 election
The success of the 1980 election and the formation of an internationally legitimate 
government was paramount to the success of the British government's long term plans 
for Rhodesia that had been formed at Lancaster House. Whilst these plans had been 
used as a framework for independence in Rhodesia, the shifting nature of diplomatic 
ties and the volatile political status of the nation and region as a whole had threatened 
the ability of Lord Soames to oversee a legitimate election in the country. The issue of 
intimidation and coercion by ZANU and the Rhodesian forces remained controversial, 
and an election outcome seen to have been unduly influenced by this would have 
risked being internationally scrutinised or even rejected. The failure of this election to 
reach a widely accepted conclusion would have been in danger of igniting the already 
tumultuous and volatile situation in a region increasingly influenced by the rising heat of
Cold War tensions in Africa. 
As such, by the eve of the election the British government and Lord Soames could do 
little but attempt to maintain as much calm as possible in Rhodesia, and to act against 
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the worst offending individuals rather than against political groups as a whole. Long 
term policy had given way to crisis management following Lancaster House and the 
international reaction to the election was to demonstrate the success of this. The 
inclusion of PF groups in the election was an immediate boost to the legitimacy of the 
election in the eyes of many, and showed the success of long term planning and policy 
by the British government. Despite this, an election invalidated by widespread 
intimidation and coercion could have reversed these successes and sent the nation 
back into a state of war. This would have been dangerous to Britain's reputation in the 
region as the failures of the 1979 election were still fresh in the minds of many, and a 
repeat of these issues would have been an embarrassing indictment of the British 
government's inability to control and remedy the situation. With Southern Africa in a 
state of transition, achieving influence in the region was key to the Cold War 
superpowers. The collapse of Rhodesia into open war, with the USSR and China 
funding black independence movements, would have threatened the ability of the 
British government to foster diplomatic and economic links in the region.
This threat of instability had been looming since the Lancaster House Conference had 
concluded, and may have been a factor in initial reactions to the 1980 election results, 
which were cautiously positive. The Rhodesian Front once again won all white roll seats
(twenty), with only 16,402 votes being cast in the white roll across the entire country.579 
For the common roll, ZANU won by a large margin, taking fifty seven of the one 
hundred seats in the Assembly to ZAPU and the UANC’s twenty and three seats, 
respectively.580 Turnout was once again high, with over 2.7 million black Rhodesians 
voting in the election.581 Voting mechanics remained relatively similar to the 1979 
election, with the country split into eight electoral districts, containing between six and 
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twelve seats.582583 The voting process itself was largely identical to that of the 1979 
election, with those who had voted marked as doing so using ultraviolet dye, as in the 
previous election.584 
Despite the minimal nature of mechanical changes to the voting process in the country, 
the international reactions to the 1980 election could not have been further from the 
general reaction in 1979. The Commonwealth Observers report was the key report 
released in the aftermath of the election. As a representative of the Commonwealth as 
a whole, and consisting of a diverse group of people from eleven countries and four 
continents, the observer group’s report was most likely to be able to legitimise or 
condemn the election through its analysis.585 The key issues raised in the wake of the 
1979 election had been the exclusion of the PF, and the use of intimidation and 
coercion by all parties. As the issue of the PF’s inclusion had been resolved by 1980, 
the main focus of international scrutiny was the use of intimidation by the PF, and the 
use of emergency powers by Soames and the Security Forces. The Commonwealth 
group handled this issue head-on, opening their section on intimidation by stating that 
the issue was ‘too often viewed in isolation from the society in which it was taking place’
and that ‘the phenomenon appeared… to be more complex than the authorities were 
either prepared to accept or admit’.586 The report argued that whilst this intimidation was
certainly an issue, that it did not have a significant effect on the result of the election in 
comparison to what was widely believed by the internal parties and the British 
administration. The overwhelming landslide victory for ZANU, combined with the 
inability of the Rhodesian and British administrations to understand and connect with 
the electorate (an early prediction poll had Muzorewa to win thirty four, not three, 
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seats), suggested that claims of intimidation being a deciding factor in the election were
unfounded.587 
Overall, the report found that taking the circumstances into account, the degree to 
which the election approached the levels required for a democratic election was 
remarkable.588 The report found that whilst intimidation and a climate of fear was 
prevalent, the pattern of voting and the successes of ZANU meant that even taking 
intimidation into account they had won by a wide margin.589 This margin was increased 
by the fact that proportional representation meant that 28,000 votes were required, on 
average, for a single seat; intimidation practised on such a scale, across multiple seats 
and regions was unfeasible.590 The report summarised and closed by stating that whilst 
criticism of the governor and Rhodesian parties was necessary, most had followed the 
spirit and law of the election. This finding was supported by the British Election 
Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, who concluded that the election was ‘in general a 
reflection of the wishes of the people, though in no sense free from intimidation and 
pressure’.591 
The general agreement of these two reports was key to the legitimacy of the election; 
the acceptance of results by the governing power in Britain and by the Commonwealth 
meant that the election had received both internal and external legitimacy, something 
that the 1979 election lacked despite the findings of Boyd and Drinkwater. Likewise, the
international media found the process to be significantly more acceptable than in 1979, 
largely due to the participation of all parties and the landslide victory of Mugabe and 
ZANU preventing ambiguity regarding the scope of intimidation. Initial reports were 
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overwhelmingly positive, with The Guardian proclaiming a ZANU landslide victory to be 
‘the clearest and best outcome’ for Rhodesia, and that any other decision would have 
lead to ‘long and damaging in-fighting or worse’.592 The Guardian further praised the 
initial make-up of the cabinet, and noted the largely university-educated, ‘technocratic 
rather than military background’ of the majority of cabinet ministers.593 Nkomo’s 
inclusion as Minister of Home Affairs showed Mugabe’s initial commitment to 
diversifying the party make-up of the cabinet, and represented attempts to give 
‘Rhodesia a broad-based government’, following Mugabe’s promise that he would not 
‘seek a monopoly of Cabinet posts’.594 Whilst The Guardian was known for somewhat of
a left-wing view, these conclusions regarding the 1980 election were largely mirrored by
the less-partisan Times. Whilst editorials in this publication did question the political 
leanings of Mugabe, with one report admitting that ‘(Mugabe was) certainly no 
Liberal’595, in general critics from across the political spectrum were in agreement that 
the election result was not a ‘victory for Moscow’, arguing that to ‘panic because Mr 
Mugabe chooses to flaunt the Marxist label (was) to risk promoting a self-fulfilling 
prophecy’.596 Regardless of individual concerns regarding Mugabe’s political 
philosophies, the election process itself was seldom criticised in the mainstream British 
press, with most commentators remaining focused on the future scope of Soviet 
influence in the region and the challenges facing Mugabe over the following months.
The election was supported by early statements made by members of government, 
which greatly allayed the concerns of many. Both Labour and Conservative MP’s 
praised the conduct at polling stations as early as 28 February, with Tory MP for 
Hexham Geoffrey Rippon and Labour MP for Mansfield Dennis Concannon noted in 
The Times to have, contrary to the norm, ‘found themselves in complete agreement’.597 
These MP’s were part of a non-partisan observer group in Rhodesia, with this cross-
party consensus legitimising the election and the report to a degree. These claims were
592  ‘The clearest and the best outcome’. The Guardian (London: UK) 5 March 1980. 12 .
593  McManus, James. ‘Mugabe includes two white Ministers’. The Guardian (London: UK) 12 
March 1980. 1.
594  Ellman, Paul. ‘Nkomo is given a job with power’. The Guardian (London: UK) 11 March 
1980. 7.
595  Steel, David. ‘I told you so from the Start’. The Times (London: UK) 6 March 1980. 16.
596  ‘Mr Mugabe’s Marxism’. The Times (London: UK) 6 March 1980. 17.
597  Ashford, Nicholas. ‘Tory and Labour MPs united in praise of orderly conduct at polling 
stations’. The Times (London: UK) 29 February 1980. 6.
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later supplemented by statements in parliament by high-ranking members of 
government. Lord Privy Seal, Sir Ian Gilmour made a public announcement the day that
Mugabe was invited to form a government that the elections were ‘free and fair’, and 
that concerns about Mugabe’s ties to the USSR were unfounded.598 This endorsement 
of the election was echoed by Dr David Owen, who congratulated Mugabe’s 
‘statesmanship which he has shown in victory… (and) his wishes to see a united 
Zimbabwe’.599 These early proclamations on 5 March were important in establishing the
legitimacy of the election, and worked in tandem with more comprehensive reports. 
Perhaps the most useful of these was a statement made by Thatcher herself, stating 
that ‘the arrangement of free and fair elections had been an outstanding 
achievement’.600 
This endorsement by the Prime Minister was effective when used in the context of the 
Commonwealth report, and the general atmosphere in Rhodesia at the time. This was 
in contrast to the British government recognition of the 1979 election, which was not 
supported by reports outside the country or by the general feeling of the Rhodesian 
population. Whilst a Mugabe victory was potentially a difficult situation for the British 
government in the longer run, the original goal of involvement in Rhodesia had been a 
success. The nation of Southern Rhodesia was to become Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980, 
with Robert Mugabe heading a ZANU dominated House of Assembly in an election that
was agreed internationally to be legitimate.
Conclusion
Throughout 1979 and 1980, overall British governmental policy in Rhodesia remained 
relatively stable, with the goal of internationally recognised, black majority rule in the 
country. From the government’s initial involvement following the controversies of April 
1979, there was a clear long-term goal for British-overseen elections that could be 
viewed internationally as sufficiently free of intimidation, coercion, and political 
exclusion. Whilst these long term goals were identified by the Foreign and 
598  Brown, Colin. ‘Gilmour endorses ‘free and fair’ election’. The Guardian (London: UK) 5 
March 1980. 5.
599  Brown, Colin. ‘Gilmour endorses ‘free and fair’ election’. The Guardian (London: UK) 5 
March 1980. 5.
600  ‘Mrs Thatcher’s good wishes for Zimbabwe’. The Times (London: UK) 5 March 1980. 14.
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Commonwealth Office and Thatcher early in 1979 and were made clear on an 
international level through the conferences at Lusaka and Lancaster House, the 
processes through which these goals would be attained were subject to an ever-shifting
combination of events and relationships within Southern Africa. The overarching goals 
of the British government regarding the decolonisation of Southern Rhodesia remained 
in place as a framework, but at times of crisis the focus of government policy was 
narrowed in order to combat short-term problems that arose. This was particularly 
noticeable in dealings between the British government and the Frontline States, as 
these nations contained the political figures most critical of Britain’s actions in the 
region. 
The initial long-term goal of the British government was to obtain a mandate for 
involvement in Rhodesia, in order to remove Ian Smith’s white minority government and
to bring the nation towards successful decolonisation. Due to the inability of Rhodesia’s 
economy and political leadership to continue to withstand continuous sanctions and 
guerilla warfare indefinitely, this mandate was easier to achieve in 1979 than at any 
point previously. The acceptance of Smith that some degree of majority rule was 
necessary presented the British government with a reason for involvement in the nation
from April onwards. In addition to this, the widely criticised nature of the election on an 
international scale and promises from the regime’s harshest critics to continue 
sanctions ensured that Smith was aware of the futility of attempting to justify the 
Internal Settlement and the April 1979 election as a route to legitimate majority rule. 
This reaffirmation of the Internal Settlement's illegality despite the majority-rule outcome
of its elections gave the British government a vital mandate for overseeing the nation’s 
transition to majority rule. The acceptance of Smith of majority rule and the promises of 
UN states to continue sanctions against any Rhodesian government brought about 
through internal agreements gave the British government ideological and practical 
reasons for political action in Rhodesia. This lack of legitimacy was the basis for long-
term planning and policy, with the holding of a constitutional conference and eventual 
internationally-legitimate elections the two major fixed policy goals that would be carried
out over the following year. The general manner in which this was to be achieved was 
through constant diplomatic contact with important political figures within key nations, 
with this being shown strongest in the turbulent relations between the British 
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government and political leaders in the Frontline States. By continually maintaining 
contact with these nations, the British government created contingency in the event of 
crises that threatened to impact the success of long term plans as strong relations with 
these nations had the potential to prevent short-term problems from spiralling out of 
control. This was most visible during the latter stages of British involvement, as by this 
point the long-term goals had been agreed by all the major actors in Rhodesia and 
Southern Africa as a whole. Whilst this was a position of some solidarity, it did mean 
that disagreements had the potential to lead to one or multiple actors straying away 
from the plans agreed at Lancaster House, which would have likely caused these to 
collapse.
Contingency and crisis management were to remain vital components of the overall 
British governmental policy in bringing legitimate majority rule to Southern Rhodesia. 
During the Nigerian embargo on British contract bids, the crisis at Beitbridge, and when
discussions at Lancaster House stalled, the British government was forced to act 
quickly and effectively in order to navigate short-term problems. Only by successfully 
doing so could longer term diplomacy be used effectively, as this required a degree of 
stability in the British government’s relationship with its allies and detractors. This ability
to respond to crisis situations as anchoring longer term plans was shown best in the 
British government’s response to early problems with Nigeria before the Lusaka 
Conference. Due to the visibility and importance of the Conference, the British 
government needed to ensure that relations with its most powerful attendees were 
strong. Whilst Australia and Canada, for example, were always likely to be relatively 
supportive of the British government, it was recognised that poor relations with African 
Commonwealth nations going into the conference would have likely spelled disaster for 
the British government’s hopes of acquiring support for involvement in Rhodesia. 
Harlech’s ‘mission’ to Africa was a prime example of this, as by doing so he was able to
speak with Nigeria as a country that was posing a short-term threat to British plans, 
whilst also meeting with the Frontline State presidents in order to try and establish 
closer ties that would benefit the British government in the long-run. By utilising long-
term diplomacy alongside shorter term crisis management, the British government 
managed to, for the most part, achieve positive relations with its critics during this time 
period. 
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A prime example of this ability to overcome short term obstacles in order to achieve the 
longer term goals of decolonisation was through the appointment of Lord Soames. By 
appointing a governor of Rhodesia who was to report directly to the Prime Minister, the 
British government ensured that they had an ally ‘on the ground’ in Rhodesia for the 
first time since UDI. Having this supportive ally in the nation allowed Soames to be 
used as a conduit for short-term policy fixes in times of crisis, whilst also understanding 
the overall policy goals of the British government. The establishment of this visible 
figure in Southern Africa provided the British government with an ally who was able to 
implement policies more effectively in the country, such as through punitive measures 
against those guilty of breaching the Lancaster House Agreement. This allowed for 
Soames to be used to implement solutions for short term crisis management in 
Rhodesia whilst understanding the longer term needs of the British government. 
Without the placement of a such a figure in Rhodesia at the highest level it may have 
been more difficult for the British government to respond with agility to events such as 
the crisis at Beitbridge or questions of ZANLA intimidation, as without Soames it would 
have been more difficult for the government to respond to changing situations and 
alliances with agility and precision on a short-term basis. 
The British government’s long-term plans for Southern Rhodesia were successful in 
that the February 1980 elections were widely recognised as legitimate on an 
international level. Alongside this, the overall goal of decolonisation was achieved as 
Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in April 1980 and passed from British control to majority 
rule. Whilst these achievements were not without new difficulties for the British 
government such as the radical nature of Mugabe and ZANU, short-term crises had 
been resolved for the most part in order to allow the overall goals of decolonisation to 
be reached. The issue of electoral and constitutional legitimacy had guided these long 
term goals from shortly after the 1979 election, to during the Lancaster House 
Conference and when overseeing the 1980 pre-election and election periods. By 
focusing on achieving these targets of legitimate majority rule, the British government 
was able to use crisis management in tandem with more abstract diplomacy over the 
course of the year in order to address current and future problems at the same time. 
Without this ability to quickly react to shifting situations and alliances in Southern Africa 
whilst maintaining an overall plan, the already difficult and troubled transition to 
legitimate majority rule in Southern Rhodesia may have been even harder to achieve.
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Glossary
Important Locations
Beitbridge- Bridge and border town in the South of Rhodesia connecting the nation 
with South Africa. 
Frontline States- A loose coalition of African countries surrounding the white minority 
states of South Africa and Rhodesia. This group included Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.
Lancaster House- Location of meeting between the RF, PF, UANC and British 
government to form plans to achieve legitimate majority rule in Rhodesia.
Lusaka- Capital of Zambia. Location of the 1979 Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting.
Rhodesia- The name for Southern Rhodesia from 1965-79 under Ian Smith’s white 
minority government. This state was not internationally recognised.
Salisbury- Capital of Rhodesia (now called Harare).
Southern Rhodesia- The official name for the British Colony until April 1980, when it 
became known as Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe- Name given to Rhodesia after its independence in 1980.
Zimbabwe Rhodesia- The name for Southern Rhodesia between June and December 
1979 under Bishop Muzorewa’s majority government. This state was not internationally 
recognised.
Important Figures
Achilles Papadopoulos- British ambassador to Maputo during 1979 and 1980.
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Antonio Neto- President of Angola from 1975 to 1979.
Alan Lennox-Boyd, 1st Viscount Boyd of Merton (Lord Boyd)- Travelled with an 
observer group to Rhodesia to report on the 1979 election for the British government.
Bishop Abel Muzorewa- Leader of the UANC and Prime Minister of Zimbabwe 
Rhodesia from June-December 1979.
Cyrus Vance- US Secretary of State from 1977 to 1980.
David Ormsby-Gore, 5th Baron Harlech- Conservative politician and diplomat. 
Tasked with visiting the Frontline States and Nigeria during 1979 on a diplomatic 
mission.
Dr. Claire Palley- Rhodesian constitutional lawyer who prepared two reports on the 
1979 Rhodesian election.
Felix Houphouet-Boigny- President of the Ivory Coast from 1960 to 1993.
General Peter Walls- Head of the Rhodesian Armed Forces from 1977 to 1980.
Herbert Chitepo- Leader of ZANU until 1975, when he was assassinated in Zambia.
Ian Smith- Prime Minister of Rhodesia between 1964 and 1979.
Joe Clark- Prime Minister of Canada from 1979 to 1980.
Jimmy Carter- President of the USA from 1977 to 1981.
John Drinkwater, QC- Prepared a report on the 1979 Rhodesian election alongside 
Lord Boyd’s.
Jose Eduardo dos Santos- Angolan President from 1979 to present.
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Joshua Nkomo- Leader of ZAPU and ZIPRA since 1974. Minister of Home Affairs from
the 1980 election until 1982. Vice-President of ZImbabwe from 1987 to 1999 after 
allowing ZAPU to merge with ZANU to create ZANU-PF.
Julius Nyerere- President of Tanzania from 1964 to 1985.
Kenneth Kaunda- President of Zambia from 1964 to 1991.
Lord Christopher Soames- Conservative politician and governor of Southern 
Rhodesia from December 1979 to April 1980.
Lord Peter Carrington- Conservative politician and Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs from 1979 to 1982.
Ian Gilmour, Baron Gilmour of Craigmillar-  Conservative Politician and Lord Privy 
Seal from 1979 to 1981. In this role he was the chief government spokesman in the 
House of Commons for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
Malcolm Fraser- Prime Minister of Australia from 1975 to 1983.
Margaret Thatcher- Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from May 1979 to 
November 1990.
Mark Chona- One of Kenneth Kaunda’s foremost foreign policy advisors during the late
1970s and early 1980s. Often present at meetings between Kaunda and British 
diplomats.
Mervyn Brown- High Commissioner to Nigeria 1979 to 1983.
Michael F. Daly- British Ambassador to Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Niger from 1978 
to 1983.
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Ndabaningi Sithole- Founder of ZANU alongside Robert Mugabe. Split from Mugabe’s
ZANU in 1975. Signed 1978 Internal Settlement and joined Muzorewa’s government in 
1979.
Pratap Chitnis, Baron Chitnis- Prepared a report on the 1979 Rhodesian election for 
the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group.
P.W. Botha- Leader of South Africa from 1978 to 1989.
Richard Luce, Baron Luce- Conservative Politician and Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1979 to 1981.
Robert Mugabe- Leader of ZANLA from 1975. Leader of ZANU during the 1980 
election. Prime Minister of Zimbabwe after winning the 1980 election until 1987. 
President of Zimbabwe from 1987 to present.
Robin Renwick, Baron Renwick of Clifton- Rhodesia Department, 1978 to 1980. 
Political advisor to Governor of Rhodesia during 1980.
Roderic Lyne- Assistant to the Foreign Secretary from 1979 to 1982.
Samora Machel- President of Mozambique from 1975 to 1986.
Simeon Ake- Foreign Minister of the Ivory Coast in 1980.
Sir Anthony Duff- British diplomat. Leader of the British delegation to Lancaster House
and later Deputy Governor of Southern Rhodesia.
Sir Derek M. Day- Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office during 1979 and 1980.
Sir Peter J.S. Moon- British High Commissioner to Tanzania from 1978 to 1980.
Sir W. Leonard Allinson- British High Commissioner to Zambia from 1978 to 1980.
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Valery Giscard- President of France from 1974 until 1981.
William R. Tolbert Jr.- President of Liberia from 1971 to 1980.
Important Groups, Meetings and Organisations
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (also known as the 
Commonwealth Conference or Lusaka Conference)- Meeting between heads of 
Commonwealth governments every 2 years. Held in Lusaka in 1979.
FRELIMO- (Mozambique Liberation Front)- Military organisation supporting ZANU as
a nationalist movement until 1975 and as the leading party in Mozambique from 1975.
FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe)- Breakaway faction from ZANU and 
ZAPU formed in 1971. Mostly known for its armed infiltrations of Rhodesia across the 
Zambia border in 1972 and 1973. Disbanded in 1973 after the OAU supported ZANU 
and ZAPU over it.
MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)- Leading political party of 
Angola since 1975. Supported African nationalism in Rhodesia.
OAU (Organisation of African Unity)- Multinational group consisting of a number of 
African states, dedicated to eradication of white minority rule.
Lancaster House Conference- Constitutional conference between internal and 
external African parties in Rhodesia, the RF, and the British government. This meeting 
was organised in order to create a new constitution for the country that would form the 
basis for majority rule.
Patriotic Front (PF)- Political and Military coalition between ZANU and ZAPU between 
1976 and 1980.
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Rhodesian Front- Main white political party in Rhodesia, led by Ian smith from 1964-
1981. Controlled the House of Assembly until 1979.
UANC (United African National Council)- Political party led by Bishop Muzorewa 
from 1979 to 1994.
UN Security Council- Wing of the UN charged with maintaining international peace 
and security through sanctions and Resolutions.
ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union)- Political party led by Robert Mugabe from
1975. Outlawed until December 1979 and referred to as part of the PF alongside 
ZAPU. Officially known as ZANU-PF during the 1980 election to distinguish it from 
Ndabaningi Sithole’s ZANU.
ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army)- Military wing of ZANU.
ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union)- Political party led by Joshua Nkomo. 
Outlawed until December 1979.
ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army)- Military wing of ZAPU.
ZUPO (Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation)- Political party in Rhodesia. Won 
6.4percent of the vote in the 1979 election.
Key Terms
CAB- British government Cabinet Office files at the National Archives.
Common Roll- The electoral roll for black representatives in the Rhodesian House of 
Assembly.
FCO- British government Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
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Internal Settlement- 1978 agreement between Ian Smith and moderate African 
leaders Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Jeremiah Chirau. This 
agreement set terms for the country to hold elections leading to black majority rule.
House of Assembly- The parliament of Rhodesia. Contained fifty seats, all for white 
representatives until after the 1977 election. Contained seventy-two black and twenty-
eight white constituency members who would then vote for eight white non-
constituency members in 1979. Contained eighty black and twenty white members in 
1980.
PREM- Prime Minister’s Office files at the British National Archives.
Rhodesian Bush War- War fought from July 1964 to December 1979. Ian Smith’s 
Rhodesian government fought militant Zimbabwean groups ZANLA and ZIPRA. These 
groups were primarily backed by China/Tanzania/Mozambique and the Soviet 
Union/Cuba/Zambia, respectively.
UDI- Ian Smith’s ‘Universal Declaration of Independence’ from the British government, 
claimed in 1965.
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